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Abstract
A Millian heir accepts the wages of Sinn
by
Juliana Faccio Lima
Propositions have been traditionally taken to play diﬀerent roles in philoso-
phy of language, most prominently as the meaning of (utterances of) sentences,
what determines their truth-value, and the content of cognitive attitudes, like
beliefs, desires, etc. In this dissertation I challenge this view. More speciﬁcally,
I argue that the semantic and cognitive content of proper names are diﬀerent
contents, and oﬀer an alternative theory about their relation.
A ﬁrst motivation to rethink the relationship between semantic and cog-
nitive content of names is that at ﬁrst sight, the most well develop theories of
the meaning of proper names have prima facie claim over mutually exclusive
group of intuitions. The Millian Theory, according to which the meaning of
a proper names is only its referent, explains well intuitions related the mean-
ing and truth-value of (simple) sentences with proper names in the subject
position but fails to oﬀer a suitable candidate for the content of cognitive at-
titudes. In contrast, the Fregean Theory, according to which the meaning of a
proper name is a mode of presentation of its referent, seems unable to account
for the meaning and truth-value of (simple) sentences with proper names but
correctly captures an aspect of proper names related to their cognitive content.
I further argue that we have not been oﬀered good reasons that semantic
vi
and cognitive content are the same contents. Most common arguments rely
on, as I argue, the false claim that we cannot explain the validity of certain
inferences and the truth-conditions of belief ascriptions unless semantic and
cognitive content are the same. In light of that, I developed a theory of the
semantic and cognitive content of proper names which treats them as diﬀerent
contents. I then argue that it oﬀers a good account of puzzles about belief and
belief ascriptions, like Frege's Puzzle, among others. One of the most note-
worthy aspect of the the proposed theory is its treatment of belief ascriptions
that diﬀer only with respect to the name in the `that'-clause. In my view, we
can account for possible diﬀerence in their truth-value and explanatory power
in action-explanation without relying on claims about pragmatics of belief as-
criptions while at the same keeping the belief-relation a binary relation, and
the semantic content of co-referential names the same.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Propositions have been in the center of the discussion since John Stuart Mill
and Gottlob Frege marked the beginning of philosophy of language as is known
nowadays. There is, we can say, little agreement on which kind of content a
proposition is. However, surprisingly, philosophers seem to agree (with a few
subverts) that propositions serve (at least) ﬁve distinct roles: the meaning of
(utterances) of sentences, the meaning preserved in translations, what deter-
mines the truth-value of sentences in the actual and alternative worlds, and
the content of mental states like beliefs, desires, intentions, and others.
In the search of such a multitasking entity, philosophers of a certain tra-
dition agree that propositions are structured entities, that is, complex entities
made up of parts tied up together in a certain way. However, when it comes
to a discussion about the proposition expressed by sentences with a proper
name in the subject position, chaos ensue. On one camp, we have Millians,
according to whom the propositional contribution of a proper name is only the
1
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object it refers to. On the other camp, we have Fregeans, according to whom
the propositional contribution if a proper name is a mode of presentation of
the object to which it refers.
The lack of agreement between philosophers in these two camps comes
from, in part, because each view has advantages. The theory espoused by
Millians oﬀers an account of proposition expressed by sentences with a proper
name in the subject position that does a stunning job at determining the
truth-value of sentences in the actual and alternative worlds. However, despite
Millians's protests, their proposal seems to fail miserably when it comes to
oﬀering the content of mental states because we have good evidence that the
content of mental states are more ﬁne-grained than what we get from Millians
proposal. As a matter of fact, they seem to be as ﬁne-grained as Fregeans
propose. The problem with Fregeans's proposal is that such a ﬁne-grained
content does a terrible job at determining the truth-value of sentences, again,
despite their protests.
In light of the success and failure of the Millian and the Fregean Theories
in their proposal of what looks like an entity that serve all ﬁve roles, I suggest
that we take a step back and contemplate what we have: a good account of
the ﬁrst four roles and of the ﬁfth role, as long as their are played by diﬀerent
contents. In this dissertation, I propose we revise the assumption that one
entity should serve all ﬁve roles. In accordance with this idea, I develop a
theory that treats the semantic and the mental content as diﬀerent contents.
Though I do not oﬀer an in depth account of what a cognitive content is, I
oﬀer an account of the bridge between them that, if I am right, accounts for
2
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the puzzles we ﬁnd in the literature.
As for the structure of this dissertation, in Chapter II I explain in details
an initial motivation to give up the assumption that only one entity should
serve the ﬁve roles. In Chapter II, I discuss two possible arguments for the
claim that only one content should determine the truth-value of a sentence
and be the content of the mental states related to it. I also explain why I
dislike some ways of patching the Millian Theory so that the semantic content
of the names also work as its mental content. Chapter 4 is where I develop
my proposal in details. I lay out the basic thesis that make up the theory I
want to endorse, explain who to connect the semantic and the mental content,
in addition to oﬀering an account of the truth-value of belief ascriptions, and
an explanation of the most famous puzzles of belief ascriptions. At the end, I
address four possible objections to my proposal.
3
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this ﬁrst chapter I want to oﬀer some initial motivation for my project
of dissociating the semantic from the cognitive content. In order to give the
reader some familiar ground to make my own proposal more palatable, I begin
by laying out the roles two most prominent traditional theories in philosophy of
language  the Fregean and theMillian theories  ascribe to propositions. With
this framework, I explain the problems they face and will propose a division
of these roles into two groups: semantic intuitions, and cognitive intuition.
The division will then gives us prima facie reasons to rethink the notion of
proposition.
2.1 What are propositions?  Part I
King [64] has oﬀered a comprehensive list of the roles abstract entities
commonly referred to by `propositions' are expected to play in two well-known
semantic theories available: the Fregean and the Millian theories, to be ex-
4
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plained shortly. The roles they are supposed to play come from intuitions we
have about language, truth-value, modality, among others. So for each of these
roles there are intuitions that are supposed to be explained by propositions.
The ﬁrst role is to be the pieces of information encoded by (utterances of)
sentences. There is an intuition that (1) and (2) below encode diﬀerent pieces
of information:
(1) Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(2) Superman ﬂies.
A competent speaker may express diﬀerent pieces of information when using
(1) and (2); and one who understands the sentences will grasp diﬀerent pieces
of information. The piece of information intuitively encoded by sentences is
often said to be a proposition.
The second role often ascribe to proposition is to be the piece of information
preserved in translations. (1) is a sentence in English and is ordinarily taken to
be properly translated into Portuguese by the sentence, presumably, because
they have the same meaning:
(3) Aristóteles nasceu em Estagira.
The meaning preserved in translations is often said to be a proposition.1
1Note that not all cases of what is commonly called `translation' intend to preserve the
meaning. In some situations a translation of the overall intention of the original speaker
might be enough to count as a translation  as when I quickly translate something I have
heard in English to my friends who only speak Portuguese. That some translations are not
meaning preserving is not a problem for those who endorse this second role of propositions.
What they need is only that some translations are proper translations in virtue of preserving
the meaning, and that seems true.
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Third, there is the role of determining whether a sentence is true or false.
Presumably, (1) is true in virtue of its content being an true (accurate) rep-
resentation of how things happened. In this way, propositions are the content
expressed by sentences that explain their intuitive truth-value.
In philosophical discussions we often times talk about the truth-value of a
sentence in diﬀerent worlds. A world is a way things might have been. For
instance, in the actual world  the way things actually are  Aristotle was
born in Stagira, was the teacher of Alexander, the Great, is the author of
De Anima, etc. But things might have gone diﬀerently, and Aristotle could
have been born in the nearby city of Olympia, mastered the arts of plumbing
and was never interested in philosophy. We can further suppose, Arimnestus,
Aristotle's brother, accomplished everything we attribute to Aristotle in the
actual world and was born in Stagira. Call this world `w1'. In the same way
we talk about a sentence being true in the actual world, we can talk about
it being true in a diﬀerent world. For instance, (1) is intuitively true in the
actual world but false in w1. As with the third role, propositions plays the
roles of determining the truth-value of sentences in alternative worlds.
We have beliefs, desires, intentions, etc, all of which have contents  I will
call them `cognitive attitudes'. For instance, among the beliefs I have, one of
them is that two plus two equals four and another is that Aristotle was born
in Stagira. Presumably, these beliefs diﬀer from each other in some respect.
For instance, one belief is about two plus two equaling four and the other is
about Aristotle being born in Stagira. Additionally, if folk-psychology is right,
the former but not the latter oﬀers part of my motivation to give a cashier $4
6
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dollars to pay for two coﬀee bags that cost $2 each (together with my desire to
pay the right price, among other things). More often than not, this diﬀerence
between theses beliefs is cashed out in terms of a diﬀerence in their contents,
and they are is usually taken to be a proposition. This is their ﬁfth role.
The last two roles King pins on propositions are far less intuitive the ones
previously mentioned, which is why I will leave them aside. One is that propo-
sitions are also the content of (some of) our perceptual experiences. The idea
is that the content of our perceptual experiences have veridicality conditions
very similar to the truth-conditions propositions have. Some philosophers then
treat them as being the same. The other is the role of propositions as part of
the deﬁnition of (possible) worlds: (possible) worlds are deﬁned as a consistent
sets of propositions.
So, according to what I will call `Traditional Theories', a proposition is
the content encoded by sentences, preserved in (proper) translations, what
determines the truth-value of sentences in the actual and alternative worlds,
and is the content of beliefs, desires, etc. These roles played by propositions
reveal one of their metaphysical aspects. There is another relevant metaphys-
ical aspect of propositions about its nature, that is, the kind of content that
constitutes a proposition. The pursue of such an account of proposition that
plays the ﬁrst ﬁve roles and, consequently, uniﬁes the intuitions behind them
is one of the main endeavors undertaken by philosophers of language.
The question about what kind of content a proposition is is itself too broad
and complex to be addressed here, so I need to narrow down the discussion.
First, my focus will be on two theories according to which propositions are
7
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abstract structured entities we get by principles of compositionality. That is
to say, a proposition is a complex abstract entity, with its constituents tied
together in a certain way (usually indicated by the syntactical form of the
sentence that expresses it). For instance, the sentence `Aristotle was born
in Stagira' is a complex linguistic entity the constituents of which are the
name`Aristotle' and the predicate `to be born in Stagira'2. Similarly, according
to this view, the proposition it expresses is a complex entity the constituents
of which are the propositional contribution of `Aristotle' and of the predicate
`to be born in Stagira', combined according to principles of compositionality.
This will leave out of the discussion theories according to which propositions
are sets of possible worlds, for instance.
Second, I will narrow down the discussion even more to the propositional
contribution of proper names like `Aristotle'. The reason for that is purely
practical. When we talk the problems theories have in ﬁnding a suitable en-
tity to play the ﬁve roles mentioned about, the theories that come are about
the propositional contribution of proper names, most likely because the most
prominent exposition of the problem was made by Frege [26] and centers
around proper names. This does not mean that theories about the propo-
sitional contribution of other linguistic expressions  like indexicals (as known
as deictic, like `I', `he', `now', `this', `that' etc.), predicates (like `to be born
in Stagira', `to be wise', etc.), nouns (like `fortnight', etc.), etc.  do not have
similar problems. It is well-known that they do, and I will mention them in
2I will be ignoring issues about tense throughout this dissertation.
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some occasions.
Finally, by listing the roles propositions are supposed to play I do not mean
to imply that they are uncontroversially accept for everyone. Many philoso-
phers have argues that, for instance, there does not need to be something that
is common to (1) and (3) to explain why they translate each other. According
to this line of reasoning, an account of the nature of propositions does not need
to take this role into consideration. While I do not deny that such arguments
are relevant, I oﬀered the list of roles propositions are supposed to play in an
uncontroversial way because they are accepted by the theories I will consider.
2.2 What are Propositions?  Part II
Although there are several diﬀerent Traditional Theories of the proposi-
tional contribution of proper names, they can be generally classiﬁed as Fregean
or Millian theories, named after Frege and Mill, respectively. In this section
I will explain what I will refer to by `the Fregean theory' and `the Millian
theory' throughout this work, and explain the prima facie problems they face,
without going into possible replies  which will be surveyed in Chapter II.
Note that I do not claim or intend to argue that Frege or Mill actually endorse
the theories as characterized here. As a matter of fact, the theories as I will
deﬁne here is not spelled out in enough details to ascribe it to one philosopher
or other. This is on purpose so the labels `Fregean theory' and `Millian theory'
can be used to refer to diﬀerent theories that are similar in the relevant aspect
for the discussion here. Whenever my remarks or objections depend details of
9
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a particular theory, I will make it clear.
Fregean and Millian Theories are Traditional in the sense that their aim is
to provide us with the propositional contribution of names that can play the
ﬁve roles alluded to before. Interestingly, arguments in favor or against them
usually rely on how well their account fulﬁll the ﬁve roles and accommodates
our intuitions. Let me start with the Millian Theory.
2.2.1 The Millian Theory
The label `Millian theory' refers to a cluster of theories which are similar
to a theory proposed by Mill at least regarding proper names. These theories
endorse the following thesis:3
(T1) The semantic content of a sentence of the form pFaq, such that
paq is a proper name and pFq is a predicate, is the proposition
semantically expressed by the sentence.
(T2) The semantic content of a sentence of the form pFaq is a struc-
tured entity determined by the semantic content of its basic
expressions, namely, paq and pFq, and principles of composi-
tionality.
(T3) The cognitive content of a belief is the semantic content ex-
pressed by a sentence that expresses the belief.
3Corner quotes (`p' and `q') enclose variables that range over sentences, which throughout
this dissertation are represented by expressions within quotation marks.
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(T4) The semantic content of a proper name is its referent.
(T5) The semantic content of a predicate is a property.
(T1) introduces a new piece of terminology. For reasons that will become
clear later, I will reserve the term `proposition' and `propositional contribution'
to refer to the semantic content of sentences and basic expressions, respectively,
only in theories that endorse (T3), that is, that say that the cognitive content is
the semantic content. In this way, the terms `semantic content' and `cognitive
content' are neutral terms to refer to the content of linguistic expression and
the content of cognitive attitudes, like beliefs, respectively.
In (T2), `basic expressions' refer to the smallest meaningful expressions of
language; or the building blocks of a language. Proper names and predicates
are just one kind, but there are others, like the aforementioned indexicals,
nouns, and others. `Principles of compositionality' here refer to how we tie
together the semantic contribution of the basic expressions. A principle of
compositionality is an important element of the Millian Theory because it dis-
tinguishes the semantic content of sentences with the same basic expressions,
like `Aristotle loves Superman' ans `Superman loves Aristotle'. The sentences
say something diﬀerent that it is hard to capture by appealing to a diﬀerence in
the semantic contribution of its basic expressions. However important, princi-
ples of compositionality will not be relevant to my arguments and objections,
unless otherwise noted. So an intuitive grasp of it is enough: principles of
compositionality organize the semantic content of basic expressions in a way
that distinguishes the semantic content of complex expressions that have the
same basic expressions, like the sentences mentioned before.
11
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As I have stated before, this dissertation will mostly center around proper
names. However, indexicals will come in handy sometimes. In those cases,
(T4) can be extended to them fairly easily  the semantic content of an index-
ical in a context of use is the object it refers to in that context. For instance,
the semantic content of `I' when uttered by Mary is Mary herself.
I add (T5) so we can have the bare minimum to discuss the semantic and
cognitive content of simple sentences like pFaq. (T5) is consistent with Millian
Theories, but it should be highlighted that not all versions of Millianism en-
dorse it. Moreover, the argument and objections I develop here do not depend
on it, since they will be about proper names. Those readers annoyed by it are
welcome to replace (T5) for their favorite thesis on the semantic content of
predicates.
(T3) introduces a new technical expression, `cognitive content'. For the
moment we can think of `cognitive content' as diﬀerent name for the content
of a belief  a later discussion in Section 3.3 will reveal that they might not
be synonymous after all. The thesis is, perhaps, the most important thesis of
all, since it states the relationship between semantic and cognitive content for
Millians, which I reject.
Let me go over an example to illustrate what the Millian Theory claims.
Consider sentence (2):
(2) Superman ﬂies.
`Superman' is a proper name that refers to Superman.4 According to (T4),
4Throughout the dissertation I will consider Superman stories as if they actually hap-
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its semantic content is Superman himself, instead of some concept or way of
thinking of him, which will be represented as `Superman'. Following (T5), the
semantic content of the predicate `to ﬂy' is the property of ﬂying, which will
be represented by `to ﬂy '. Finally, we get the semantic content of (2) by (T2),
which is determined by the semantic contribution of the basics expressions.
The semantic content of a sentence is commonly represented by an ordered
pair of the semantic contribution of the basic parts within pointy brackets, as
in <Superman, to ﬂy>.
The Millian theory is a very simple and straightforward theory, and it
seems to deal pretty well with most of the intuitions laid out in the previous
section. First, according to it, the piece of information encoded by (1) and (2)
are diﬀerent, as it should be. The former express the semantic about Aristotle
and the property of being born in Stagira  <Aristotle, to be born in Stagira>,
such that `Aristotle' and `to be born in Stagira' stands for Aristotle himself
and the property of being born in Stagira, respectively  whereas the latter
express a content about Superman and the property of ﬂying  <Superman,
to ﬂy>.5
The theory also explains why (1) and (3) are considered (proper) transla-
tions of each other. According to the Millian Theory, they express the same
semantic content, namely, <Aristotle, to be born in Stagira>. This is no sur-
prise, of course, since the semantic contribution of a name is only its referent,
and `Aristotle' and `Aristóteles' refer to the same person. Therefore, as long
pened to avoid unrelated issues with empty names. See Kripke [36, 37].
5See discussion about the semantic content of predicates on page 12.
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as the translation of names preserve reference, the semantic content of the
sentences is also preserved.
The Millian theory also explains very well our intuitions about what is
true or false, at least of simple sentences. Intuitively, the truth-value of the
semantic content of (1) depends only to whether Aristotle has the property of
being born in Stagira.6 Thus, having only Aristotle and the property of being
born in Stagira as the semantic content of (1) captures well the elements on
which the truth-value of the sentence depends.
One of the most compelling reasons one might have to endorse the Millian
theory is related with intuitions about the truth-value of sentences in diﬀerent
worlds, the fourth intuition. As I explained, (1) is true at the actual world
but false in w1 where he was born in Olympia. We changed a lot of Aristotle's
properties in w1, and we even ascribed to another person, Arimnestus, all
the properties commonly ascribed to Aristotle in the actual world. And even
though in w1 Arimnestus is, in some sense, closer to how we think about
Aristotle, we would still insist that (1) is false. According to the Millian
Theory, this is exactly the truth-value (1) gets in w1. For, as explained in
the last paragraph, to say that the semantic content of (1) is <Aristotle, to
6 Note that to say that the truth-value of (1) depends only on whether Aristotle has
the property of being born in Stagira is not to say that this sentence could be true and all
others false. It might be the case that for Aristotle to have this property, he needs to have
other properties as well, like having a mother, in which case (1) could not be true unless
`Aristotle has a mother' is also true. But even if this is the case, it can still be true that the
truth-value of (1) should be sensitive only to whether Aristotle has the property of being
born in Stagira. What is false is that Aristotle could have the property of being born in
Stagira without having the property of having a mother. A way of distinguishing these two
claims is to say that the property of being born in Stagira is logically but not metaphysically
independent of the property of having a mother.
14
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be born in Stagira> is to suggest that its truth-value depends on whether
Aristotle himself has the property of being born in Stagira.
Traditionally, a proponent of the Millian Theory faces criticisms when it
comes to account for last role of being the content of cognitive attitudes  which
will arguably compromise the theory's ability to oﬀer an account of the truth-
value of sentences, third role. These problems are often times clumped together
under the name `Frege's Puzzle'. But here it will be useful to distinguish them
into two diﬀerent problems: a puzzle about belief (`Frege's Puzzle (i)') and a
puzzle about the truth-value of belief reports (`Frege's Puzzle (ii)').
As we know, Lois Lane is completely tricked by Superman's attempt of
covering up his secret identity by wearing eyeglasses. And she believes that
Superman ﬂies but she does not believes that Clark Kent ﬂies. Even though
Lois Lane has a false belief, it seems rational for her to believe that Superman
ﬂies but not believe that Clark Kent ﬂies, that is to say, Lois Lane is not in the
same position as a madman who believes that it is raining and not raining (at
the same place and time). On the contrary, it seems that Lois Lane believes and
disbelieve two diﬀerent things, and since the things one believes are cognitive
contents, Lois Lane seems to believe two diﬀerent cognitive contents.
According to (T3), the content of Lois Lane's belief is the semantic content
expressed by a sentence that expresses her belief. Intuitively, the sentence that
expresses the content of the belief that Superman ﬂies which Lois Lane believes
is (2), and the sentence that expresses the content of the belief that Clark Kent
ﬂies which Lois Lane does not believe is (5):
(2) Superman ﬂies.
15
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(5) Clark Kent ﬂies.
According to the Millian Theory, however, (2) and (5) have the same semantic
content. This is because a consequence of (T1)  (T3) is that sentences com-
posed by diﬀerent but co-referential names (organized in the same way), like
(2) and (5), express the same semantic content. The only diﬀerent between
them is on the names `Superman' and `Clark Kent'. But because their seman-
tic contribution is the same, this diﬀerence will not entail a diﬀerence in the
semantic content of the names or of the sentences. As a result, according to the
Millian Theory, Lois Lane holds conﬂicting cognitive attitudes: she believes
and disbelieves the same content, namely, <Superman, to ﬂy>, contrary to
our intuitive assessment of Lois Lane mental life. This is Frege's Puzzle (i):
how is it possible for Lois Lane to rationally believe that Superman ﬂies but
not believe that Clark Kent ﬂies, if Superman is Clark Kent?
Another way of getting the same puzzling consequence about Lois Lane's
beliefs is to look at two beliefs Lois Lane has: that Superman ﬂies and that
Clark Kent does not ﬂies. She undoubtedly believes them, and, once again,
it seems that holding these beliefs do not put her in the same position as the
aforementioned madman. Here again the Millian Theory will face a problem.
According to it, the cognitive content of her ﬁrst belief is the semantic content
of (2), which is the semantic content of (5). The cognitive content of her other
belief is the semantic content of (6) below:
(6) Clark Kent does not ﬂy.
The semantic content of (6) is just the negation of the semantic content of (5).
16
Preliminaries Chapter 2
Since the semantic content is the cognitive content, and the cognitive content of
(2) just is the cognitive content of (5), it entails that, according to the Millian
Theory, Lois Lane believes a content and its negation, that is, a contradiction.
However, this consequence seems to be incorrect. Lois Lane does not seem
to believe contradictory contents like the madman. In this way, the puzzling
question arises: how is it possible for Lois Lane to believe that Superman ﬂies
and that Clark Kent does not ﬂy without believing contradictory contents, if
Superman is Clark Kent?
Closely related to Frege's Puzzle about belief, we have Frege's Puzzle about
the truth-value of belief reports. Given what we know about the story, (7) but
not (8) below is true.
(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
(8) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
According to the Millian theory, both (7) and (8) express the same semantic
content because, as I argued before, sentences composed by diﬀerent but co-
referential names (organized in the same way), as (7) and (8), express the same
semantic content. This entails, among other things, that (7) is true if, and only
if, (8) is true. But this consequence clashes with their intuitive truth-value:
(7) is true but (8) is false. In other words, the Millian Theory does not seem
to give a correct account of the truth-value of some sentences. This is Frege's
Puzzle (ii): how is it possible for (7) and (8) have diﬀerent truth-values if they
express the same semantic content?
Despite of how well the semantic content according to the Millian Theory
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plays most of the roles laid out in the last section, philosophers have taken its
apparent inability to answer Frege's Puzzles (i) and (ii) good reason to look
for a diﬀerent semantic theory. Those who reject the Millian Theory in general
turn to some version or other of the Fregean Theory.
2.2.2 The Fregean Theory
From the Millian Theory we get the Fregean Theory by keeping thesis (T1)
 (T3) and replacing (T4) and (T5) with the following thesis:
(T6) The semantic content of a proper name is a mode of presenta-
tion of its referent.
(T7) The semantic content of a predicate is a mode of presentation
of a property.
As I noted before, I have (T7) just to have the bare minimum to discuss the
semantic and cognitive content of simple sentences like pFaq. While (T7) is
consistent with the other thesis I ascribe to the Fregean Theory, it is possible
to endorse (T6) but reject (T7). Here again, the readers who dislike (T7)
are welcome to replace it by their favorite thesis on the semantic content of
predicates.
Modifying the Millian Theory in this way we end up with a theory in the
spirit of one proposed most prominently by Gottlob Frege [26], which is why
I am calling it Fregean Though I should warn the reader not to read to much
into the name. The Fregean Theory and Frege's theory are similar, but this
section should not be understood as an attempt to reconstruct the latter. So,
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the reader should not assume that the terms and expressions as is used here
have the deﬁnition Frege gives them, even though sometimes my proposed
deﬁnitions will come close to Frege's deﬁnitions.
(T6) introduces a new terminology. A mode of presentation or way of
thinking of an object is a way of representing an object in a way that indi-
viduates it. For instance, a way of thinking of Superman is to think of him
as the man who wears red underwear over blue pants ; another way is to think
of him as the reporter of the Daily Planet who was never seen together with
Superman. One way of thinking of Aristotle is as the author of de Anima;
another way is to think of him as the famous teacher of Alexander, the Great.
All the examples of modes of presentation I use to illustrate what a mode
of presentation is are conceptual representations, that is, a representation in-
volving concepts, like, man, underwear, philosopher, etc. But it should be
noted that not all philosopher who defend some version of the Fregean The-
ory claim that modes of presentation are conceptual. For instance, Evans [21]
argues that there are ways of thinking about an object that involves only a
cognitive ability of keep track of the object as you perceive it, which can be
roughly understood as paying attention at the object for a period of time. For
the sake of simplicity the examples of modes of presentation here will always
be conceptual.
An important feature of a mode of presentation is that it can only present
one object  which is why we use deﬁnite descriptions to characterize concep-
tual modes of presentation. For my examples, the reader should assume that
the descriptions are satisﬁed by only one object. This is not a problematic
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assumption because in principle there are uniquely satisﬁed descriptions, if
not of all objects, at least of the objects we ordinarily name.7
Let us consider again (2):
(2) Superman ﬂies.
According to the Fregean Theory, the the semantic content of `Superman' is a
mode of presentation of Superman, for instance the man who wears red under-
wear over blue pants. Following (T7), the semantic content of `to ﬂy' is a mode
of presentation of the property to ﬂy; since the semantic content of predicates
is not the subject under discussion, let us abbreviate this mode, whatever it
is, as contentfly. By (T2), the semantic content of (2) is determined by the
semantic contribution of `Superman' and `to ﬂy', which can be represented
as <the man who wears red underwear over blue pants, contentfly> and will
be abbreviated as <contentSM , contentfly>, such that `contentSM ' abbreviates
the man who wears red underwear over blue pants.
The Fregean Theory, as a Traditional theory, was proposed with the in-
tention of oﬀering an account of the semantic content of sentences that play
(at least) the ﬁve roles as well as explaining the intuitions listed in the ﬁrst
section. Let us examine how well it does the job, starting with role of being the
cognitive content of beliefs, and addressing the closely related Frege's Puzzles
(i) and (ii).
7A closely related concern is about whether we can oﬀer purely qualitative uniquely
satisﬁed descriptions of objects, that is, descriptions that only uses concepts and no names
or indexical expressions. But this should not concern us here.
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Recall that Frege's Puzzle (i) call for an answer to the question of how
it is possible for Lois Lane to rationally believe that Superman ﬂies but not
believe that Clark Kent ﬂies, given that Superman is Clark Kent. Following
(T3), the cognitive contents that she believes and does not believe are the
semantic content of the sentences that express them. (2) and (5) are the
natural candidates.
(5) Clark Kent ﬂies.
The semantic content of (2) is <contentSM , contentfly>, as I explained. On
the other hand, the semantic content of (5) according to the Fregean Theory
is diﬀerent because the semantic content of `Clark Kent' and `Superman' are
diﬀerent. According to (T6), the semantic content of `Clark Kent' is a mode
of presentation but it is not the same mode of presentation as the semantic
content of `Superman'; it is a content like the reporter of the Daily Planet who
was never seen with together with Superman, to be abbreviated as `contentCK '.
In this way, the semantic content of (5) is <contentCK , contentfly>
The reason the Fregean Theory have room to distinguish the semantic
content of `Superman' and `Clark Kent' is because it endorses the criterion to
distinguish the semantic content of names below (together with principles of
compositionality):
Frege's Criterion
Two sentences S and S ′ diﬀer in semantic and cognitive content if,
and only if, some rational agent who understood both could, on
reﬂection, judge that S is true without judging that S ′ is true.
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According to Frege's Criterion, we should distinguish the semantic and cogni-
tive content of (2) and (5) because there is a rational agent, namely, Lois Lane,
who understands both and judge that (2) is true (given that she believes it)
without judging (5) true (given that she does not believe it). Since the only
diﬀerence between the sentences is in the names `Superman' and `Clark Kent',
by principles of compositionality, it entails that `Superman' and `Clark Kent'
have diﬀerent semantic and cognitive contents.
To answer the question in Frege's Puzzle (i): according to the Fregean
Theory, the cognitive content of what Lois Lane believes and of what she does
not believe are diﬀerent. She believes <contentSM , contentfly> (roughly, that
the man who wears red underwear over blue pants ﬂies) but does not believe
<contentCK , contentfly> (roughly, that the reporter of the Daily Planet who
was never seen together with Superman does not ﬂy).
The Fregean Theory also has a nice explanation of how it is possible for
Lois Lane to rationally believe that Superman ﬂies and Clark Kent does not
ﬂy, given that Superman is Clark Kent. According to it, the semantic content
of (6) is a simple negation of the semantic content of (5),8 which can be repre-
sented as <contentCK , contentfly, Neg>. But because the semantic content of
(5) and (2) are not the same, the semantic content of (6) is not a simple nega-
tion of the semantic content of (2), that is, <contentSM , contentfly>. Thus,
if Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies and that Clark Kent does not ﬂy,
she does not believe a content and its negation, which means she is not like a
8What I mean by this is that we can recognize that (6) negates (5) by means of a
undemanding cognitive process, that is, it does not require complex a complex reasoning.
22
Preliminaries Chapter 2
madman who believes a content and its negation.
The Fregean Theory's answer to Frege's Puzzle (ii), the puzzle about belief
reports is, perhaps, a bit less attractive but still satisfactory. According to it,
(7) and (8) express diﬀerent semantic contents, because the semantic contri-
bution of one of their basic expressions, namely, `Superman' and `Clark Kent'
is diﬀerent: contentSM and contentCK , respectively.9
(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
(8) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
Thus, a diﬀerence in their truth-value does not entail a contradiction, as with
the Millian Theory.
The Fregean Theory is very elegant from the cognitive content point of
view, given its intuitive answer to Frege's Puzzle (i). To believe what is ex-
pressed by (2) is to believe that the man who wears red underwear over blue
pants ﬂies (that is, <contentSM , to ﬂy>). On the other hand, to disbelieve
what is expressed by (5) is to disbelieve that the reporter of the Daily Planet
who was never seen together with Superman ﬂies (<contentCK , to ﬂy>). These
are two diﬀerent contents, so Lois Lane does not believe and disbelieve the same
content. Moreover, to believe what is expressed by (6) is to believe that the
reporter of the Daily Planet who was never seen together with Superman does
not ﬂy (<contentCK , to ﬂy, Neg>). This is not a simple negation of the belief
9Note that this departs from Frege's proposal, according to which the semantic content
and the referent of `Superman' and `Clark Kent' in (7) and (8) is diﬀerent from their semantic
content and referent in (2) and (5), respectively. More about this later on Section 4.6.
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expressed by (2), so Lois Lane does not believe a content and its negation.
The semantic content according to the Fregean Theory has no problem
with the role of pieces of information encoded. Pieces of information encoded
by (1) and (2) are diﬀerent semantic contents. The ﬁrst is determined by a
mode of presentation of Aristotle, say the famous teacher of Alexander, the
Great (contentAristotle for short), and a mode of presentation of the property
of being born in Stagira, say contentborn in Stagira, which can be represented
as <contentAristotle, contentborn in Stagira>. On the other hand, (2) encodes a
diﬀerent piece of information <contentSM , to ﬂy>.
The semantic content as mode of presentation does a good job at explaining
what is preserved in translations. Both sentences (1) and (3) express the same
semantic content determined by a mode of presentation of Aristotle and of the
property of being born in Stagira: <contentAristotle, contentborn in Stagira>.
(1) Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(3) Aristóteles nasceu em Estagira.
Unfortunately, the Fregean Theory faces serious problems when we it comes
to the roles related with the truth-value of sentences. Semantic contents are
thought to determine whether a sentence is true of false. According to the
Fregean Theory, the semantic content of a sentence of the form pFaq is true if,
and only if, the object that ﬁts the description that is the semantic contribution
of paq has the property of being F.10 In this way, (1) is true if, and only if, the
10Technically, the object that ﬁts the description that is the semantic contribution of paq
ﬁts the description that is the semantic contribution of pFq.
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famous teacher of Alexander, the Great, whoever she is, was born in Stagira.
(1) is true in the actual world, and this is also the truth-value according to
the Fregean Theory: the famous teacher of Alexander, the Great, is Aristotle
and he was born in Stagira.
Despite predicting the correct truth-value for (1), the Fregean Theory
seems to do it in a too convoluted way. As I explained before, whether (1) is
true or false should depend on whether Aristotle was born in Stagira and not
on whether he was born in Aristotle and was the teacher of the Alexander, the
Great (see fn. 6). The problem with the way the truth-value of sentences is
determined according to the Fregean Theory is made more explicit when we
consider the truth-value of sentences in diﬀerent possible worlds. In w1, a world
in which Aristotle was born in Olympia and was a plumber and Arimnestus
accomplished everything we attribute to Aristotle and was born in Stagira, (1)
seem false. After all, Aristotle was not born in Stagira. However, according
to the Fregean Theory, the sentence comes out true because the object that
ﬁts the description the famous teacher of Alexander, the Great is Arimnestus
and he was born in Stagira in w1.
The appeal the Fregean Theory has given its elegant explanation of the
cognitive content seems to vanish on the face of such a serious ﬂaw. On the
other hand, it does not seem wise to turn back to the Millian Theory because
it does not have a satisfactory account of the content of beliefs, that is, the
cognitive content. So what to do now?
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2.3 Breaking with Tradition
It is hard not to get puzzled and at the same time amazed by the picture
that emerged from the last two sections. The Millian and the Fregean Theories
seem to oﬀer the best account of contents that plays diﬀerent roles. On the
one hand, the Millian Theory oﬀers a good explanation of that content that
determine whether a sentence is true or false in the actual and diﬀerent worlds.
On the other hand, we have intuitions related to the cognitive content of beliefs
that the Fregean theory seems to give the most appropriate explanation. In
the light of this, I propose that we stop looking for a content that plays all
ﬁves roles and instead develop a theory that respects such a natural division.
Before we venture any further into this quest, some deﬁnitions are in order.
Let us reserve the expression `semantic content' to refer to the content related
to the truth-value of sentences (in the actual or other worlds). In this way,
the third and the fourth roles listed (determining the truth-value of sentences
in the actual and alternative worlds) are semantic roles, and their correspond-
ing intuitions (intuitions about the truth-value of sentences in the actual and
alternative worlds) are semantic intuitions. Similarly, we shall reserve the ex-
pression `cognitive content' to refer to the content of beliefs, desires, thoughts,
etc. The ﬁfth role listed (being the content of beliefs) is a cognitive role, and
its corresponding intuition (distinguishing belief contents, and explanation of
motivation of actions) is a cognitive intuition.
For reasons I will not discuss here, I will also consider the content that plays
the ﬁrst (being the piece of information encoded by sentences) and the sec-
ond roles (being the content preserved in translations) as a semantic content.
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According to my terminology, they are semantic roles and their corresponding
intuition are semantic intuitions (distinguishing pieces of information encoded
by diﬀerent sentences and preservation of meaning in translations).
In the light of the new terminology, a proposition can deﬁned as a content
that is both a semantic and a cognitive content. Theories that deny that there
is a content that plays semantic and cognitive roles reject (T3), which I will
call the `Traditional Claim'. Theories that endorse such a claim are Traditional
Theories.
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Arguments for the Traditional
Claim
As I prefaced in the last chapter, here I will to propose a theory in which the
semantic content of names is only its referent but its cognitive content is like
a mode of presentation, thereby rejecting (T3), the Traditional Claim. There
I oﬀered a ﬁrst motivation for such a view.
In this chapter, I want to discuss two possible arguments in favor of the
Traditional claim. I call them `possible' argument because in the literature we
do not ﬁnd an argument with the purpose of endorsing the Traditional Claim.
But there are arguments that could have been used for such a purpose. In
the last section, I will consider a common Millian maneuver to address the
problem raised by our cognitive intuitions. Since part of my reason to propose
a diﬀerent way of organizing our intuitions depends on the Millian Theory not
being able to accommodate cognitive intuitions, I need to explain why I am
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dissatisﬁed with Millian replies.
By the end of this section I will have oﬀered further reasons to continue
with the project of looking for alternative ways of accounting for the relation
between semantic and cognitive contents.
3.1 Speaks's Argument
Consider the following argument [65, p.10]:
Proposition Argument:
(9.1) John said that Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(9.2) It is true that Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(9.3) Though it is true that Aristotle was born in Stagira, it would
have been false if things had gone diﬀerently.
(9.4) Mary believed that Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(9C) Therefore, there is something which John said, which was true,
which could have been false, and which Mary believed.
The Proposition Argument seems valid, that is, if the premises are true, then
the conclusion is necessarily true. A Traditionalist (i.e. philosophers who en-
dorse the Traditional Claim) might take the intuitive validity of this argument
to oﬀer support for the Traditional Claim in the following way.
29
Arguments for the Traditional Claim Chapter 3
First, `that Aristotle was born in Stagira' has to signify the same thing in
all premises,1 or else it would be possible for the premises to be true  one
content that John said, another that is true, a third content that could have
been false, and a last one that is what Mary believed  and the conclusion
false, invalidating the argument.
Second, in each of the premises, `that Aristotle was born in Stagira' signi-
ﬁes the content that ﬁgures in the state of aﬀairs that makes them true. For
instance, (9.1) is true only if we have a state of aﬀairs in which the person sig-
niﬁed by `John' is in the relation signiﬁed by `to say' with the content signiﬁed
by `that Aristotle was born in Stagira'. Similarly for the other premises: (9.2)
is true only if the content signiﬁed by `that Aristotle was born in Stagira' has
the property signiﬁed by `to be true'; (9.3) is true only if the content signiﬁed
by the `that Aristotle was born in Stagira' has the property signiﬁed by `to be
true' and the property signiﬁed by `to be false if things had gone diﬀerently';
and (9.4) is true only if the person signiﬁed by `Mary' is in the relation sig-
niﬁed by `to believe' with the content signiﬁed by `that Aristotle was born in
Stagira'.
Lastly, according to my proposed division of contents in Section 2.3, the
contents that ﬁgure in the state of aﬀairs that make (9.1) and (9.4) true are
cognitive contents, for cognitive contents are the contents of John's and Mary's
cognitive attitudes.2 And the contents that ﬁgure in the state of aﬀairs that
1Here I am purposefully using the neutral expression `to signify' and not `to refer' or `to
denote' to avoid the discussion about how the words signify what they do.
2The sentence `John said that Aristotle was born in Stagira' can be understood in at
least two diﬀerent ways: as a report of the words John uttered or a report of the content
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make (9.2) and (9.3) true are referring to are semantic contents for semantic
contents are that which are true or false in the actual and alternative worlds.
Thus, semantic and cognitive contents have to be the same content, if we want
to preserve intuitions about the validity of the Proposition Argument.
While I do not dispute that the Proposition Argument is valid, or the ﬁrst
premise of Speaks's argument (i.e., that `that Aristotle was born in Stagira'
signiﬁes the same thing in all premises), I will dispute the second premise. I
agree with Traditionalists that the 'that'-clause signiﬁes something that reveals
the content that ﬁgures in the state of aﬀairs that make the premises true. But
it is open for debate whether 'that'-clauses signify is the content that ﬁgures
in the state of aﬀairs. Just to give an example, one could argue that `that
Aristotle was born in Stagira' signiﬁes M , but oﬀer the following analysis
of the belief-relation: Mary believes that M in virtue of being disposed to
inward assent or agree to a content F , where M and F are truth-functionally
equivalent. I am not saying that this is a correct view, it is not, but it illustrates
how it is possible for `that Aristotle was born in Stagira' to signify a content
that do not ﬁgure in the state of aﬀairs that make the sentence (it is part of)
true. Moreover, in this view, the Proposition Argument is still valid.
John expressed. In the Proposition argument, (9.1) is meant as a report of the content
and not a report of the words John uttered. However, once we distinguish semantic and
cognitive content, a new ambiguity arises. (9.1) may now report two diﬀerent contents, in
addition to the words John uttered: the semantic content or the cognitive content expressed
by John. I recognize that the question about whether we say semantic or cognitive contents
is important but it is only tangential to my project. Here I will consider (9.1) a report of
cognitive content and treat it just like belief reports, as it has been traditionally considered.
But even if (9.1) turns out to be a report of a semantic content, it would require adjustments
to the arguments but it would not change the main ﬁndings here.
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Before I move on I want to point that the argument as given by Speaks is
not exactly the argument I just presented. Originally, Speaks used the argu-
ment to support the view that there are abstract entities which are the content
of declarative sentences and against semantic theories that deny it, speciﬁcally,
Davidson's semantic theory. I am using Speaks's argument here because it has
been suggested to me his argument could also be used in support of the Tra-
ditional Claim. In this dissertation, I will only discuss the argument with the
purpose of supporting the Traditional Claim, and I will ignore Speaks's orig-
inal purpose. So when I talk about Speaks's argument, I mean the argument
as I proposed here and not his original argument.
3.2 Salmon's Semantic Argument
At the beginning of his book, Salmon [58, pp. 2-6] provides an argument for
the claim that that we have [cognitive] attitudes towards singular propositions
 the semantic content expressed by a sentence of the form pFaq, such that paq
is singular term and its contribution to the semantic content of the sentence is
only its referent. If Salmon is correct, then we may have an argument for the
Traditional Claim with the addition of supporting arguments and assumptions
that are relatively uncontroversial.
In a nutshell, Salmon's insight is to take the semantic content of 'that'-
clauses in true belief reports to reveal the cognitive content of beliefs. Consider
the sentence:
(10) Tom is thinking that Ted Kennedy is tall.
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This sentence is true if, and only if, Tom is thinking a thought with a
certain content. The question is: which content is it? For Salmon, the answer
is fairly straightforward: (1) `that Ted Kennedy is tall' is a term that refers
to the semantic content of `Ted Kennedy is tall', and (2) belief reports are
referring to the content of beliefs, thus the content of Tom's belief is whatever
is referred to by `that Ted Kennedy is tall'.
To support (1), Salmon argues that the following is the semantic rule that
captures the semantic functioning of `that':
(SSR) For any (open or closed) sentence pΦq, the result of preﬁxing
pΦq with the `that'-operator, pthat Φq, refers with respect to
semantic parameters (such as time, a possible world, a context,
or an assignment of values to variables) to the semantic content
of pΦq with respect to those parameters. [58, p.6]
The argument Salmon oﬀers for (SSR) is that it provides the best explanation
for intuitively valid inferences like the following:
All humans are created equal.
(11.1) Smith doubts that all humans are created equal.
(11.2) Jones believes that all humans are created equal.
(11C) Therefore, there is something that Jones believes but Smith
doubts.
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If `that all men are created equal ' refers to the same object in both (11.1) and
(11.2), then it is easy to see that (11C) follows. Morever, this inference is
similar to an inference involving singular referring terms like:
John sentences
(12.1) John walks.
(12.2) John dances.
(12C) Therefore, there is something that walks and dances.
Since we have good reasons to classify `John' is a referential term, by parity of
reason, we should consider `that all men are created equal' to be a referential
term as well.
I do not doubt that Salmon right about (SSR). I am less certain about (2)
 belief reports are referring to the content of beliefs  most likely because it
is not clear to me what his argument for (2) is. My best guess is that he has
something like the following argument in the background: (3) the truth of (10)
depends on Tom standing in a thought-relation with the object referred to by
the 'that'-clause; (4) the only way of Tom standing in a thought-relation with
the object referred to by the 'that'-clause is if it [the referent of the 'that'-
clause] is the content of his thought; thus, the truth of belief reports depends
on the referent of the 'that'-clause being the content of Tom's thought.
After my reply to Speaks, it is not hard to see where Salmon's argument
goes wrong. Premise (4) is debatable. One could agree that `that Ted Kennedy
is tall' refers to the semantic content of `Ted Kennedy is tall', and oﬀer the
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following analysis of the thought- relation: Tom is thinking that Ted Kennedy
is tall in virtue of standing in a entertaining-relation with a content F , where
the semantic content of `Ted Kennedy is tall' and F are truth-functionally
equivalent. Again, I am not saying that this is a correct view, but it makes
clear the problem with the argument.
As with Speaks's argument, the argument I spelled out here and ascribed
to Salmon is not the argument he develops in his book. The original argument,
i.e. as present by Salmon, takes place in a discussion in which his opponent
endorses the Traditional Claim but deny that singular propositions can be the
cognitive content. The original argument suggests that singular propositions
can be the content of cognitive attitudes. I have argued that the Semantic
Argument in a debate on the Traditional Claim has some ﬂaws. I do not take
myself to have argued that the argument in its intended debate has the ﬂaws
I pointed.
3.3 Previous Attempts
In the ﬁrst chapter I explained that part of the motivation to develop an
alternative view is that the Fregean and the Millian Theories face problems
when we assume that a single content is the semantic and the cognitive content.
Proponents of each theory are well aware of the problems, and they have
oﬀered replies. It would be, however, impractical to survey he answers for
each theory here, or oﬀer a knock down objections to each of them. Since I am
more inclined to the Millian Theory as a semantic theory  perhaps suggesting
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that Salmon [58] is right when he claims that the Millian Theory `has a prima
facie claim on our endorsement'  I will take it my starting point. In this
section I will discuss diﬀerent answers to the problems for the Millian theory
raised on Chapter 2.
To recap, proponents of the Millian Theory have to explain (i) how it is
possible for Lois Lane to believe that Superman ﬂies but not believe that
Clark Kent ﬂies, given that Superman is Clark Kent; and (ii) the apparent
clash between the truth-value of (7) and (8) according to the theory and our
intuitions.
Crimmmins, Perry, Salmon, Soames, among many others,3 suggest that a
belief can be looked at from diﬀerent perspectives, and, in this sense, it has
two diﬀerent contents. There is the content of the belief which is what the
belief represents. From this perspective, Lois Lane's beliefs that Superman
ﬂies and that Clark Kent ﬂies have the same content because they represent
the same thing, namely, Superman having the property of ﬂying. However,
there is another perspective from which we can look at her beliefs, which is
how Lois Lane believes the content of the belief. Given how the story goes,
Lois Lane has two diﬀerent modes of presentation or two diﬀerent ways of
grasping the same content that Superman ﬂies: one as the man who wears
red underwear over blue pants ﬂies and the other as the reporter of the Daily
Planet who was never seen together with Superman ﬂies. For reasons that will
3To be sure, there are great diﬀerences between the theories these philosophers have
proposed, some of which will be explained shortly. See Perry [42, 13], Kaplan [34, 35],
Salmon [58, 55], Soames [63].
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become clear soon, I will call it the `motivational aspect' of a belief. From
the motivational aspect (or the mode of presentation), Lois Lane's beliefs are
diﬀerent because she thinks of Superman in two diﬀerent ways.
Millians now can explain Frege's Puzzle (i). It is possible for Lois Lane
to believe that Superman ﬂies but not that Clark Kent ﬂies because she has
two diﬀerent ways of representing the content Superman having the property
of ﬂying, which she obviously does not see as ways of representing the same
content. Under one way she believes that Superman ﬂies; under the other, she
does not.
The distinction between the content of the belief and the motivational
aspect also explains how Lois Lane can believe that Superman ﬂies and that
Clark Kent does not ﬂy without believing contradictory beliefs. With the
discovery of two aspects of beliefs, to believe contradictory beliefs is to believe
a content and its negations when representing them in the same way  and
not simply to believe a content of a belief and its negation. Had Lois Lane
believed that Superman ﬂies as the man who wears red underwear over blue
pants ﬂies and that Superman does not ﬂy as the man who wears red underwear
over blue pants does not ﬂy, she would have believed contradictory contents.
But this is not Lois Lane's position. She believes that Superman ﬂies when
representing Superman in one way, and she believes that Superman does not
ﬂy when representing Superman in another way.
From this Millian viewpoint, part of Fregeans's mistake is to collapse the
content of the belief with its motivational aspect. Cognitive intuitions that
give rise to Frege's Puzzle are explained by diﬀerences in the motivational
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aspect of belief, and not by diﬀerences in the content of the belief.
The Millian reply to Frege's Puzzle (i) is clever but, I shall argue, wrong.
Fregeans are right in insisting the content of the belief cannot be distinguished
from the motivational aspect as Millians want.
Suppose Lois Lane is on the top of a building on ﬁre, sees a man wearing
red underwear over blue pants, and jump into his arms. What motivated her
to jump into his arms? One could say that it was the fact that Superman
was behind her. However, it is not hard to see that the fact alone cannot give
Lois Lane's motivation to perform an action: had she not believed it, it could
not have motivated her to jump into his arms. As suggested, a better answer
to the question is that she believed that Superman was behind her, that he
ﬂies, that he could carry her to the ground safe and sound, in addition to
her desire to be safe, with other background beliefs, desires, etc.4 So beliefs
(desires, among other things) have motivational power, that is, in the right
circumstances, they motivate us to perform certain actions  which action an
agent will perform depends on what she believes.
Beliefs are naturally distinguished in terms of the actions they motivate.
For instance, keep the situation described before the same and just replace the
belief that Superman is behind her for the belief that Clark Kent is behind
her. Based on what we know about Lois Lane's cognitive life  she does not
look for Clark Kent in dangerous situations, and does not believes that Clark
4This is not to say that had we asked Lois Lane why she jumped into Superman's arm
she would say `Because I believed that Superman was behind me.' The question about her
motivation to act is not a question about what she would have said had we asked her why
she performed such an action.
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Kent ﬂies or that he could save her , we would not expect her to jump into
the arms of the guy behind. In this case, we would probably expect her to
scream for help, or something like that. So, in the same circumstances, the
beliefs that Superman is behind her and the belief that Clark Kent is behind
her motivate diﬀerent actions. This leads us to conclude that the beliefs are
diﬀerent, and support the thesis stated: beliefs can be distinguished by the
actions they motivate in the same circumstances.
All that I have said so far ﬁts very well with how we ordinarily explain
people's intentional behavior, one of the primary reasons we ascribe beliefs to
agents. The belief that Superman is behind Lois Lane has the explanatory
role in her behavior only if it motivates the same behavior in the same cir-
cumstances. Thus, if the belief that Clark Kent is behind Lois Lane does not
motivate her to behave the same way, then they are two diﬀerent beliefs.
The Millian reply under discussion is not incompatible with the ordinary
explanation. According to it, the belief that Superman is behind Lois Lane
and the belief that Clark Kent is behind Lois Lane are diﬀerent because their
motivational aspect is diﬀerent, even though their contents are the same. And
so, as Braun has [5] argued, strictly speaking, Millianism does not makes
psychological generalizations false. What makes me wary about this account
of beliefs is that it seems to single out beliefs from other representations. In
general, if two representations are diﬀerent, then they have diﬀerent contents.
For instance, if two putative pictures are diﬀerent pictures, then they have
diﬀerent contents. Or if we two putative movies are diﬀerent, then they have
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diﬀerent contents.5 The diﬃcult question in these cases is to determine when
two putative pictures or movies are diﬀerent. Are two putative pictures of
the same house diﬀerent pictures? Are two movies about the same event
diﬀerent movies? The answer to those questions might not be clear. But what
is important is that an answer to these questions would entail a claim about
their contents.
By analogy, if two putative beliefs are diﬀerent beliefs, then they should
have diﬀerent contents. Unlike pictures and movies, the question `Are the
beliefs that Superman is behind Lois Lane and the belief that Clark Kent is
behind Lois Lane diﬀerent beliefs?' has not only a clear answer but a positive
answer, as I argued in three paragraphs ago. This means that the beliefs that
Superman is behind Lois Lane and that that Clark Kent is behind Lois Lane
have diﬀerent contents, contrary to the Millian proposal. Of course beliefs,
pictures, and movies are diﬀerent kinds of representations, and to some extent
they will have important diﬀerences  just to mention one, beliefs as mental
states of a subject can motive her to act, whereas pictures as pictures and
movies as movies (not as the content of a belief) cannot. But claims about
the relation between a representation and its content should be true to all
representations, regardless of their kind. The Millian proposal that the content
of the beliefs that Superman is behind Lois Lane and that that Clark Kent is
behind Lois Lane diﬀer not with respect to their content entails that beliefs qua
representations are not like other representations. Such a strong claim requires
5By `two pictures' and `two movies' I do not mean two diﬀerent physical copies.
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much more arguments that we have been given. For this reason, I take that
the Millian reply considered here does not account for Frege's Puzzle (i).
The Millian solution to Frege's Puzzle (ii) does not fare much better either.
Its problems range from disregard to isomorphism between syntax and logical
form of belief reports, intuitions about the truth or falsity of belief reports
and explanation of bodily actions  which problems (or combination thereof)
the solution has depends on which version we consider. I will illustrate the
problems by discussing two versions of the reply in more details, one oﬀered
by Crimmins and Perry [13], and another oﬀered by Salmon [58].
Crimmins and Perry6 propose that the belief relation semantically ex-
pressed by `to believe' in pS believes that Pq is a ternary relation among
speakers, semantic/belief contents and motivational aspect to indicate how
speakers think about P. In this way, (7) and (8) means (13) and (14), respec-
tively:
(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
(13) Lois Lane believes <Superman, ﬂies> by means of the man
who wears red underwear over blue pants.
(8) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
(14) Lois Lane believes that <Superman, ﬂies> by means of the
reporter of the Daily Planet who has never been seen together
with Superman.
6op. cit.
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Part of their motivation for this proposal is to preserve our intuitions about the
truth-value and explanatory power of (7) and (8). In this account, (7) comes
out true because Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies when she thinks of
Superman as the man who wears red underwear over blue pants. On the other
hand, (8) is false because Lois Lane does not believe that Superman ﬂies when
she thinks of Superman as the reporter of the Daily Planet who has never been
seen together with Superman. The diﬀerence in truth-value is not a problem
because (7) and (8) express diﬀerent semantic contents, even though (2) and
(5) express the same semantic content. For similar reasons, Crimmins and
Perry's account explain why (15) and (16) below are not interchangeable to
answer the question about Lois Lane motivation to jump into Superman's
arms: they have diﬀerent semantic contents.
(15) Lois Lane believes Superman is behind her.
(16) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is behind her.
While Crimmins and Perry's solution to the puzzle is attractive, it de-
nies isomorphism between syntax and logical form of belief reports. Surface
grammar suggests that `to believe' is a binary relation between a subject and
a semantic content (assuming that `that'-operator is a referring device of se-
mantic content, as Salmon has argued). But under their proposal, `to believe'
turns out a ternary relation. Although disregarding surface grammar is not,
by itself, bad  as many would argue with the Russellian treatment of deﬁnite
descriptions, to give an example , we need good reasons to do so. The reasons
we are oﬀered are not good reasons for they are not independently motivated.
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As a matter of fact, the reason we have is to preserve the Millian Theory as
a semantic theory for proper names, especially if we keep in mind that the
solution for Frege's Puzzle (i) is problematic, as I already argued.
Salmon's [58] version of the solution does not do away with the binary
belief relation, thereby preserving isomorphism between syntax and logical
form. But, he argues, the binary belief-relation should be analyzed in terms
of an existential generalization of a ternary relation between a subject, a the
content of belief (i.e., the semantic content referred to by 'that'-clause) and a
mode of presentation of the content, which he calls `BEL'. Loosely speaking,
a subject S is in the BEL relation with a semantic content P by means of a
mode of presentation m when S is disposed to inward assent or agree to P
when taken in way m [58, p. 111].7 This gives us the following analysis of the
belief-relation:
(17) S believes that P if, and only if, ∃x [S grasps P by means of x
& BEL(S, P , x)]
(17) says that S believes that P if, and only if, S stands in the BEL-relation
with P by a mode of presentation. In this way, (7) express the binary belief
relation between Lois Lane and the semantic content of (2). Given (17), (7) is
true if, and only if, Lois Lane stands in BEL-relation with <Superman, ﬂies>
(the semantic content of the 'that'-clause) and a mode of presentation:
7Salmon deﬁnes other notions related to the belief relation but this is not be relevant for
the cases I will discuss here.
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(18) Lois Lane believes <Superman, ﬂies> if, and only if, ∃x [Lois
Lane grasps <Superman, ﬂies> by means of x & BEL(Lois
Lane, <Superman, ﬂies>, x)]
As Salmon notes, right-hand side of the biconditional is true: Lois Lane is
disposed to assent to the proposition <Superman, ﬂies> by means of a mode
of presentation, namely, the man who wears red underwear over blue pants
ﬂies. Thus, Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies, and (7) is true.
Despite the advantage of Salmon's theory of maintaining isomorphism be-
tween syntax and logical form, it comes with what I take to be a high cost of
denying the intuitive diﬀerent in the truth-value of (7) and (8) and the expla-
nation of actions. In Salmon's view, (7) and (8) have the same truth-value:
both are true if, and only if, Lois Lane stands in the BEL-relation with <Su-
perman, ﬂies> and a mode of presentation. Since, as we saw, she does, then
(7) and (8) are true. For similar reasons, both (15) and (16) give the correct
answer to the question about Lois Lane's motivation to jump into Superman's
arms. If her motivation is the belief that Superman is behind her, then either
sentence will express this. The intuition that only (15) express the right belief
and that (7) and (8) have diﬀerent truth-value is explained away by means
of pragmatic implicatures. (7) and (8), as well as (15) and (16), pragmati-
cally impart diﬀerent contents which we mistakenly take to be their semantic
content.
The problems I raised here for the line of solution to Frege's Puzzle (ii) are
not new. Crimmins, Perry, Salmon and other philosophers who oﬀer the same
line of explanation are well aware of them, and they have oﬀered responses.
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I will not go into the details of the discussion, but suﬃce to say that they
do not deny the charges. In general, they argue that the counterintuitive
consequences are not as bad as they seem. But for those who, like me, are not
willing to give them up, it is time to look for alternative accounts.
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What's Next? Positive Theory
In Chapter 2 I explained the tension between our semantic and cognitive intu-
itions, which arises from our ambition of having one theory to account for both
intuitions. On the one hand, semantic intuitions seem to support the Millian
Theory about the semantic content of proper names. On the other hand, our
cognitive intuitions seem to support the Fregean Theory.
In an attempt to take both semantic and cognitive intuitions seriously, I
proposed that we reject the Traditional Claim, and take the semantic and
cognitive content to be distinct contents. In Chapter II, I give some prima
facie plausibility for such a proposal by explaining how the validity of certain
inferences and the truth-conditions of belief reports that could have been taken
to support the Traditional Claim can be at least equally well accommodated
by an account that rejects it. I have also explained my dissatisfaction with the
Millians replies to the problem raised by Frege's Puzzle (i) and (ii).
In this chapter I spell out in details of a theory that does not have the
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Traditional Claim among its theses. The way I proposed a separation of the
intuitions in Chapter 2 gave away a lot of the theory I want to develop. I will
start by laying out the theses behind that were on the background in Chapter
2 and Chapter II, and add other theses to ﬁll in the gaps. In Section 4.3 and
Section 4.4, I explain in details how it solves the most basic puzzles about
the relation between semantic and cognitive content. In Section 4.5 I will go
back to Speaks, Salmon's, argument and explain details the replies I have only
sketched in Section II. I ﬁnish this chapter with Section 4.6 in which I reply
to objections speciﬁc to my view.
4.1 The Theory
The theory I endorse retain only theses (T2), (T4) and (T5)1 of the the
Millian Theory to restrict its scope to the semantic content:
(T2) The semantic content of a sentence of the form pFaq is a struc-
tured entity determined by the semantic content of its basic
expressions, namely, paq and pFq, and principles of composi-
tionality.
(T4) The semantic content of a proper name is its referent.
(T5) The semantic content of a predicate is a property.
1See comment on (T5) on page 12.
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I replace (T3), which gives the cognitive content, by the following theses which
are Fregean in spirit:
(T8) The cognitive content of a cognitive subject S's belief is the
cognitive content for S of a sentence that expresses the belief.
(T9) The cognitive content of (an utterance of) a sentence for a
cognitive subject S is a structured entity determined by the
cognitive content of its basic expressions for S.
(T10) The cognitive content of (an utterance of) a name `N ' for a
cognitive subject S is the mode of presentation of its referent
associated with `N ' for S.
(T11) The cognitive content of (an utterance of) a predicate pFq for a
cognitive subject S is the mode of presentation of the property
it signiﬁes associated with the predicate for S.
I use the expression `cognitive subject' as a neutral term to mean any individual
capable of having cognitive attitudes, including non-human animals, if we later
decide they are capable of cognitive attitudes.
(T10) is one of the central thesis of my theory, so it is worth spending some
time clarifying it. According to it, not all modes of presentation associated
with a name `N ' for a cognitive subject S are the cognitive content of `N ' for
S. The thesis is very explicit in stating that the cognitive content of the name
for an agent is a mode of presentation of its referent. If Lois Lane associates
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a mode of presentation δ of Arimnestus with the name `Aristotle', δ is not the
cognitive content of `Aristotle' for her. In this way we prevent mismatches
between the object represented by a cognitive content and the object referred
to by a name.
One might worry that (T10) implies that if a name `N ' has a cognitive
content for an cognitive subject S, then it guarantees that S has at least one
mode of presentation that ﬁts the referent. And, the objection goes, this is
false for agents can have beliefs of objects even if they do not ﬁt the descriptive
content of the cognitive content. For instance, suppose John is colorblind. He
sees an object ﬂying in the sky and, upon reﬂection (is it a bird? is it an
airplane?), he realizes that it is Superman. Like Lois Lane, he could think of
Superman by means of a description of his outﬁt. However, because John is
colorblind the way of thinking is diﬀerent from Lois Lane's; it is a description
like: the man who wears dark gray underwear over gray pants, the γ, for short.
It is hard to deny that in this case the γ is of Superman. However, according
to the objection, in my view it is not of Superman because he does not ﬁt
the description  he is not wearing gray pants, he is wearing his regular blue
pants.
The objection rests on a false assumption that cognitive contents represent
an object necessarily in virtue of it satisfying the descriptive content. But this
is not how I think of the relation between cognitive contents and the repre-
sented object, especially if we keep in mind that cognitive contents might not
be conceptual, in which case there is no descriptive content for its represented
object to ﬁt. An account of the relationship between cognitive content (rep-
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resentation) and represented object that I am particularly attracted to is as
a causal account: a cognitive content CC is of an object o if, and only if, o
(somehow) causes CC. This explanation ﬁts well in John's case: the man who
wears dark gray underwear over gray pants is causally related with Superman
for Superman caused John's visual perception, which was then translated into
a description.2
The last remarks about cognitive contents reveal that (T10) is fregean
in spirit but cognitive contents do not collapse with the fregean notion of a
mode of presentation. According to the Fregean Theory, a (fregean) mode
of presentation determines the referent and represents the object that ﬁts
the description. In my proposed theory, the cognitive content has no role in
determining the semantic content of names  the orthodox way is to think
that the reference is causally determined , and the object they represent do
not need to satisfy the description. So even though cognitive contents have a
fregean feel to them, we should keep in mind that they are not the same as a
fregean mode of presentation.
Not surprisingly, the proposed theory accommodates the semantic intu-
itions in Chapter 2 just as well as the Millian Theory. The pieces of informa-
tion encoded by (1) and (2) are diﬀerent because they refer to diﬀerent objects
2I do not take such a causal account to be uncontroversial, and I admit that it should be
discussed further. But I shall not argue for it here. For the remainder of this dissertation, I
will suppose that there are ways of cashing out the relation between a mode of presentation
and the object it represents that does not require the object to ﬁt the description. For
diﬀerent ways a causal relation can determine the content of mental states see Block [2],
Devitt [18], Dretske [19, 20], Fodor [24, 25], Harman [31], and Sterelny [67]  the latter
argues for a view closest to what I have in mind.
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and predicates
(1) Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(2) Superman ﬂies.
It also explains why (3) is a proper translation of (1); they express the same
semantic content in diﬀerent languages.
(3) Aristótles nasceu em Estagira.
Finally, the semantic content captures the elements which the truth-value of
sentences with proper names depends on when evaluating the sentence in the
actual worlds or alternative worlds, as explained before.
Like with the Millian Theory, theses (T2) and (T4) entail that (2) and (5)
have the same semantic content, namely, <Superman, to ﬂy>.
(2) Superman ﬂies.
(5) Clark Kent ﬂies.
However, unlike the Millian Theory, their cognitive content might not be the
same. According to (T8)  (T11), the cognitive content of a sentence is rela-
tivized to cognitive subjects and may vary depending on which mode of pre-
sentation is associated with `Superman' and `Clark Kent' for them. For Lois
Lane, the sentences have diﬀerent cognitive contents (as I shall later in Sec-
tion 4.3 explain why)  something along the lines of the man who wears red
underwear over blue pants ﬂies (`the σ ﬂies ' for short) and the reporter of the
Daily Planet who was never seen together with Superman ﬂies (`the ρ ﬂies ' for
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short), respectively.3 For other cognitive subjects, like Jonathan Kent, Super-
man's father, the cognitive content of (2) and (5) could be the same. It all
depends on which cognitive content is associated with the names for them.
Allowing cognitive contents of a sentence, names, and predicates to vary
according to cognitive subjects is a welcome result, given how I proposed we
understand the notion of cognitive content in Chapter 2 and Chapter II 
a content that individuates beliefs and motivates action  and the fact that
for Jonathan the name `Superman' and `Clark Kent' are interchangeable from
the viewpoint of his cognition.4 It is, however, important to note that (T9) 
(T11) understood in this way might render the talk about the cognitive content
of names simpliciter  not relative to an agent  to some extent meaningless.
This is because in my theory the most informative way of deﬁning the cognitive
content of a name simpliciter is to understand it as a function of agents to
the cognitive contents for them. Even though in this way we will be able to
3Strictly speaking, the content of Lois Lane's belief is a function of the mode of presen-
tation of Superman and the property of ﬂying.
4This does not mean that in all contexts it will be appropriate to use either name to
express his belief. As it has been well documented in the literature, especially in discussions
about the problem of exportation and truth-conditions of belief ascriptions (see [66, 29, 58,
21]), there are other contextual elements that are taken into consideration by speakers when
deciding which expression is appropriate to communicate their beliefs, like, conversational
implicatures, conventional implicatures, the cognitive content of the names for the speaker's
audience (together with the aim the speaker has in uttering a name), to name a few. To
give a simple example, suppose we want to help Superman to keep Lois Lane from ﬁnding
out about his secret identity, and she asks us whether Jonathan knows someone who ﬂies.
In this case, the reply `Yes, he knows that Clark Kent ﬂies' is inappropriate, even though
it is true and correctly answer Lois Lane's question. But it should be clear that the word
choice in this case has less to do with the cognitive content of Jonathan's beliefs, and more
to do with what we take to be the cognitive content of Lois Lane's beliefs and our intention
of not letting her to ﬁnd out that Superman is Clark Kent. The means by which a speaker
chooses to communicate beliefs does not depend exclusively on the cognitive content of the
belief she wants to communicate, but also of other relevant contextual elements.
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distinguish the cognitive content of co-referential names simpliciter (as long as
their cognitive content diﬀers for at least one agent), it will not be useful since
it will not work as evidence that the names have diﬀerent cognitive contents
for a putative cognitive subject. For the cognitive content of names simpliciter
deﬁned in this way will entail that the cognitive contents of `Superman' and
`Clark Kent' simpliciter are diﬀerent, since for Lois Lane they are diﬀerent.
But knowing that they have diﬀerent cognitive contents simpliciter will not
entail that they are diﬀerent for everyone  by assumption they are not diﬀerent
for Jonathan.
At this point we do not have all the formal resources needed to address
Frege's Puzzle (i) and (ii)  I still have to explain why the cognitive content
of (2) ad (5) are diﬀerent for Lois Lane. But we can see how the solution
is supposed to go for Frege's Puzzle (i): how is it possible for Lois Lane to
rationally believe that Superman ﬂies but not believe that Clark Kent ﬂies,
if Superman is Clark Kent? It is possible because the cognitive content of
(2) and (5) for her are diﬀerent, the σ ﬂies and the ρ ﬂies. Or we can talk
about the cognitive content of Lois Lane's belief not in relation to linguistic
expressions: it is possible because she believes and disbelieves two diﬀerent
cognitive contents, the σ ﬂies and the ρ ﬂies, respectively.
A similar explanation is available to the second version of the puzzle: how
is it possible for Lois Lane to believe that Superman ﬂies and that Clark Kent
does not ﬂy, if Superman is Clark Kent?
(2) Superman ﬂies.
(6) Clark Kent does not ﬂy.
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It is possible because the cognitive content of `Superman' and `Clark Kent' for
her are diﬀerent, the σ and the ρ, respectively. Thus, the cognitive content of
(6) for Lois Lane, namely, the ρ ﬂies, is not a simple negation of the cognitive
content of (2) for Lois Lane, namely, the σ ﬂies  the former is a simple
negation of the ρ ﬂies, and the σ ﬂies and the ρ ﬂies are diﬀerent cognitive
contents.
4.2 (Interesting and Not so Interesting) Addi-
tional Theses
Here I will list three additional thesis about cognitive contents we need to
explain some of the most well-known puzzles about belief and belief ascription
we ﬁnd in the literature.
First Thesis: Cognitive contents may diﬀer in their way of representing or
the object they represent.
Consider these sentences:
(2) Superman ﬂies.
(5) Clark Kent ﬂies.
(19) Aristotle ﬂies.
All of them should have diﬀerent cognitive contents for Lois Lane. The cog-
nitive content of (2) and (5) are distinct in terms of a diﬀerence in the way
Superman is represented, that is, the way she thinks about Superman. But,
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as I have suggested, the cognitive content of (2) and (5) does not have to be
diﬀerent for all agents, by assumption they are diﬀerent for Jonathan. On the
other hand, the cognitive content of (2) (or (5)) and (19) should be diﬀerent
for everyone because they are about diﬀerent people.5
Second Thesis: A cognitive content that represents an object having a prop-
erty is accurate if, and only if, the object represented has the property repre-
sented.
We ordinarily talk about beliefs being true or false. We say that Lois
Lane's belief that Superman ﬂies (the σ ﬂies) is true but her belief that Clark
Kent does not ﬂy (the ρ does not ﬂy) is false. In Chapter 2, I classiﬁed the
content that is true or false as a semantic content. Since I deny that cognitive
contents of beliefs are not the semantic content of the sentence that expresses
it, it might not be appropriate to talk of a cognitive content being true or
false.6
5This is important for it addresses the objection raised by Gray [30] to a similar account
of cognitive contents by Recanati [50].
6Whether it is appropriate or not depends on a number of things: is the cognitive content
of (2) for Lois Lane a semantic content albeit not the semantic content of (2)? Here I have
been giving examples of cognitive contents that are conceptual. But as I warned in Section
2.2.2, it is just for the sake of simplicity. Depending on which kind of contents are cognitive
contents. I will not address these questions here. But it is important to explain how we can
accommodate talk about truth-conditions of beliefs even if only in a derivative sense.
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In order to accommodate our ordinary talk that beliefs are true (or false),
I suggest that we think of the cognitive content of beliefs having accuracy
conditions, instead of truth-conditions. A cognitive content that represents an
object having a property is accurate if, and only if, the object represented has
the property represented. In this way, the σ ﬂies is accurate for it represents
Superman having the property of ﬂying, and it is the case, but the ρ does not
ﬂy is inaccurate because it represents Superman not having the property of
ﬂying, and this is not the case.
As a result of the restriction imposed by (T10)  a cognitive content is
mode of presentation of the referent of the name , a cognitive content CC of
a sentence u for S is accurate if, and only if, the semantic content of u is true.
In this way, there will not be cases in which a cognitive content of a sentence for
S is (in)accurate and the semantic content of the sentence is (true) false, even
if S's way of thinking of an object does not ﬁt it. For suppose John incorrectly
believes that Aristotle was the teacher of Plato, and represents Aristotle as
in this way, the τ , for short. Furthermore, suppose that the τ was born in
Stagira is the cognitive content of (1) for John. (1) is true in the actual world.
And, contrary to what one might think, the τ was born in Stagira is accurate
in the actual world because the τ represents Aristotle and he was born in
Stagira. It is incorrect to suggest that the τ was born in Stagira is inaccurate
because Socrates was born in Athens. First, such suggestion depends on the
claim that the τ represents whoever ﬁts the description, which I explained
is not how we should think of cognitive contents of objects. Second, if the
τ represents Socrates, then it cannot be the cognitive content of `Aristotle'
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because it is not of Aristotle, and the cognitive content of a name for any
cognitive subject has to be about its referent.
We can also deﬁne a notion of accurate at a world corresponding to the
notion of true at a world to accommodate the talk of beliefs true at worlds.
A cognitive content that represents an object having a property is accurate at
a world w if, and only if, the object represented has the property represented
at w. For instance, suppose Lois Lane thinks of Aristotle was the teacher of
Alexander, the Great (the α, for short) and this way of thinking is associated
with `Aristotle' for her. Thus, the cognitive content of (1) for her is the α
was born in Stagira. It is accurate in the actual world because Aristotle is the
object represented by the α and he was born in Stagira. On the other hand, it
is inaccurate in w1  where Arimnestus did all the things for which Aristotle
is know for in the actual world and was born in Stagira, whereas Aristotle
was born in Olympia  because Aristotle is the object represented by the α
and he was not born in Stagira in w1. The value of accuracy of the cognitive
content of (1) for Lois Lane follows the truth-value of the semantic content of
(1). Here will not be cases in which a cognitive content of a sentence for S is
(in)accurate at world and the semantic content of the sentence is (true) false.
Thus, a cognitive content CC of a sentence u for S is accurate at a world w
if, and only if, the semantic content of u is true at w.
Here again there is room for misunderstandings. On might suggest that
the α was born in Stagira should come out accurate in my view for reasons
similar to why the semantic content of (1) comes out true according to the
Fregean Theory. After all, the objection goes, in w1 the object represented
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by the α is Arimnestus, since he ﬁts the description, and he was born in
Stagira. This objection, like the last one, rests on a mistaken understanding
of cognitive contents of names. First, the α does not represent whoever ﬁts
the description; it represents the object causally related to it. Second, if the
α represents Arimnestus in w1, then it cannot be the cognitive content of
`Aristotle' because it is not of Aristotle, and the cognitive content of a name
for any cognitive subject has to be about its referent.
Third Thesis: To believe a contradiction is to believe a cognitive content
and its simple negation.
In my proposed account we can explain the diﬀerence between Lois Lane
and the madman by deﬁning what it means to hold contradictory beliefs in a
way that entails irrationality (in the relevant sense here) in the following way:
a cognitive subject S believes contradictory believes if, and only if, S believes
a cognitive content and also believes its simple negation. For instance, the
simple negation of the σ ﬂies is the σ does not ﬂy. But the ρ does not ﬂy is
not a simple negation of the σ ﬂies. And even though the σ ﬂies and the ρ
do not ﬂy cannot be both accurate, that does not mean that believing both is
believing a contradiction.
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4.3 The Cognitive Content of `N ' for S
In the ﬁrst section of this chapter I said that the cognitive content of
`Superman' and `Clark Kent' for Lois Lane are diﬀerent because the mode
of presentation associated with them for her are diﬀerent. But a question
remains: why are they diﬀerent?
Perhaps the most natural way of understanding which mode of presentation
is associated with a name for a cognitive subject S is as the mode of presenta-
tion S associates with `N '.7,8 Lois Lane's case seems to ﬁt in in this model very
well. She indeed associates diﬀerent modes of presentation of Superman with
the names `Superman' and `Clark Kent ': when she hears `Superman', then
mode of presentation of Superman that comes to her mind is the σ; and when
she hears `Clark Kent', the mode of presentation of Superman that comes to
her mind is the ρ. (T10.a) below captures this interpretation, if we focus on
the proper name and ignore the cognitive content of predicates.
(T10.a) The cognitive content of a name `N ' for a cognitive subject S is
the mode of presentation of its referent that S associates with
`N '.
It is not hard to see, however, that (T10.a) will not go very far. It requires
7See Richard [52, pp. 648].
8My talk about a cognitive subject associating a mode of presentation with a name might
incorrectly suggest that the association is voluntary. I do not mean to say this. The problem
is that the verb `to associate' brings the idea of a voluntary action but I do not mean to
suggest that speakers voluntarily associate certain contents to linguistic expressions. What
I mean is that someone who knows the name `N ' employs a way of thinking of the referent
of the name, which is retrieved whenever she recognizes an utterance of the name. But the
information associated with the name might not be voluntary associated.
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that S has the name in her vocabulary, but in some cases a name will have
a cognitive content for S even if it is not in her vocabulary.9 For instance,
João, a competent Portuguese speaker who does not speak English, can hold
beliefs about Superman despite not associating any cognitive content with
`Superman'. If he believes that Superman ﬂies, we can truly say that he
believes what is expressed by (2), and (20) below is true:
(20) João believes what is expressed by `Superman ﬂies'.
The truth of (20) depends on João having the cognitive content of (2) for
him in his belief box, so to speak.10 However, since the name is not in his
vocabulary  `Superman' is a name in English and, by assumption, João does
not speak English , João does not associate any mode of presentation with
`Superman'. Thus, (2) will not have a cognitive content for him, and (20) will
not be true in the supposed situation.
A natural modiﬁcation of (T10.a) to accommodate João's case is to say that
the cognitive content of a name `N ' for a cognitive subject S is the mode of
presentation of its referent that S associates with `N ' or one of its translations:
(T10.b) The cognitive content of a name `N ' for a cognitive subject S is
the mode of presentation of its referent that S associates with
`N ' or one of its translations.
9See Richard [52, p.66].
10The expression `belief box' is usually used to explain what it means to have a belief
according to the language of thought hypothesis, that is, a physical representation of a
content in the brain. However, here I am not using this expression with this meaning, and
I do not mean to say that cognitive contents are tokens in the language of thought. The
metaphor of a belief box is merely a pedagogical aid.
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With (T10.b), (20) is true, as it should be, because the cognitive content of
(2) for João is the cognitive content he associates with its translation into
Portuguese (21), which as a competent speaker of Portuguese he has in his
vocabulary, and it is in his belief box.
(21) Superhomem voa.
While (T10.b) is improvement over (T10.a), it is still subject to counter
examples, for instance, Kripke's [38] puzzle about belief. Let me ﬁrst explain
Kripke's case. Suppose José is a competent Portuguese speaker who lives in
Brazil and does not speak English11. He has heard of lot of nice things about
London, which he calls `Londres', and believes what is expressed by:
(22) Londres é bonita.
which is the Portuguese translation of the English sentence:
(23) London is pretty.
Eventually, José moves to London, but to a very unattractive neighborhood.
He has never left this unattractive neighborhood, and while there he learns
English from native English speakers who do not speak Portuguese. One of
the things he learns is that `London' is used to refer to the city he lives. So,
naturally, he believes what is expressed by (24):
(24) London is not pretty.
11The case described here is a slight modiﬁcation of Kripke's original case.
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Because of the way José learned the names `Londres' and `London', he does not
know that they refer to the same city. Now consider the following sentences:
(25) José believes what is expressed by `Londres é bonita'.
(26) José believes what is expressed by `London is not pretty'.
For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that José knows that `ser bonita' and
`to be pretty' express the same property in diﬀerent languages, and associates
the same cognitive content (is pretty) with them. (25) is true if, and only if, the
cognitive content of (22) for José is in his belief box. In José's case, (25) is true.
According to (T10.b), this means that the mode of presentation he associates
with (22) or one of its translation is in his belief box, say CCLondresis pretty,
such that `CCLondres' is a mode of presentation of London that José associates
with `Londres' and `is pretty ' is the mode of presentation of `ser bonita'.
On the other hand, in José's case, (26) is false. Since (26) is true if, and
only if, the cognitive content of (24) for José is in his belief box, according
to (T10.b), this means that the mode of presentation he associates with (24)
or one of its translation is not in his belief box. Call this cognitive content
CCLondonis not pretty, such that `CCLondon' is a mode of presentation of Lon-
don that José associates with `London' and `is not pretty ' is the mode of
presentation of `to be not pretty'.
One of the problems with (T10.b) is that we can derive a contradiction
 that (25) and (26) are true and false  with two seemingly uncontroversial
assumptions. First, if José believes that CCLondresis pretty, then he does not
believe its negation, that is, CCLondresis not pretty  which is a combination
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of the cognitive content José associates with `Londres' (CCLondres) and the
cognitive content of `não ser bonita' (is not pretty)  is not in his belief box.
Similarly, if José believes that CCLondonis not pretty, then he does not believe
the unnegated content, that is, CCLondonis pretty, which is a combination of the
cognitive content José associates with `London' (CCLondon) and the cognitive
content of `to be pretty' (is pretty). The following ﬁgure sums up our intuitions
about this case:
CCLondresis not pretty
CCLondonis pretty
CCLondresis pretty
CCLondonis not pretty
José's Belief Box
Figure 4.1
The cognitive contents inside José's belief box are the cognitive contents he be-
lieves. The cognitive contents outside his belief box are the cognitive contents
he does not believe.
From this we can derive the two aforementioned contradictions in the fol-
lowing way. (25) is true if, and only if, the cognitive content of (22) for José
is in his belief box. Given our intuitions of the case, (25) is true. However,
according to (T10.b), (25) is also false. For, according to it, the cognitive
content of (22) for José is the mode of presentation he associates with it or
one of its translations. Furthermore, the mode of presentation he associates
with one of its translation, namely, CCLondonis pretty and (23), respectively,
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is outside his belief box.
Similarly for (26). In José's case, it is false. However, if (T10.b) is correct,
(25) is also true. For (26) is true if, and only if, the cognitive content of (24)
for José is in his belief box. But according to (T10.b), the right-hand side of
the biconditional is true: the cognitive content of (24) for José is the mode of
presentation he associates with it or one of its translations, and he mode of
presentation he associates with one of its translation, namely, CCLondresis not
pretty and (27), respectively, is inside his belief box.
(27) Londres não é bonita.
With (T10.b) we were able to show that (25) and (26) are both true and
false, which is unacceptable. This suggests that we should look for a replace-
ment for (T10.b).
The problem with (T10.b) is that it ignores cases in which a speaker as-
sociates diﬀerent modes of presentation of an object with a name and one of
its translations in another language. The natural way of talking about José's
cognitive life suggests that we should give preference to the cognitive content
the speaker associates with the version of the name that appears in sentence
over the content associated with one of its translations: the argument is more
compelling if we derive the contradiction from belief reports with the sentences
(22) and (24) than from belief reports with (23) and (27). According to this line
of reasoning, the truth-value of (25) and (26) should take into consideration
the mode of presentation José associates only with `Londres' and `London',
respectively. Only if a cognitive subject does not associate any mode of pre-
sentation with the version of the name in question, like João is with respect to
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`Superman', we consider the mode of presentation she associates with one of
its translations. The following modiﬁcation of (T10.b) captures this intuition:
(T10.c) The cognitive content of a name `N ' for a cognitive subject S
is the mode of presentation of its referent that S associates
with `N ', unless S does not associate a mode of presentation
with `N ', in which case the cognitive content of `N ' for S is the
mode of presentation S associates with a translation of `N '.
This modiﬁcation might seem ad hoc at ﬁrst sight, but it really is not.
José's case is very similar to Lois Lane's case. Surely they diﬀer in that
`Londres' and `London' are in a relationship that `Superman' and `Clark Kent'
are not, namely, that of being the translation of the other in another language.
But this seems irrelevant from the cognitive point of view. What matters is
that in both cases the speaker is ignorant of the fact that the names are
co-referential, and that in both cases we do not think that such ignorance is
reason to say they are irrational. Given that, a solution to one case should also
yield a solution to the other. The proposed modiﬁcation of (T10) is just like
that: both José and Lois Lane believes and disbelieves two diﬀerent cognitive
contents because they associate two diﬀerent modes of presentation of the same
object with diﬀerent names. The resulting thesis is unsurprisingly very much
in the spirit of the Fregean Theory, with the caveat that that cognitive contents
are not semantic contents.
Does (T10.c) have the ﬁnal saying on what is the cognitive content of `N '
for S? I do not think so. Some cognitive subjects can have beliefs the cognitive
content of which are most naturally taken to be the cognitive content of name
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`N ' for them, even though they do not associate a mode of presentation with
`N ' or one of its translations. For instance, Krypto, Superman's dog, does
not know any of Superman's names given that he does not speak any natural
language12. However, it is not far fetched to suppose that he has beliefs about
Superman.13 Now suppose one of his beliefs is that that Superman ﬂies. In
this case, it seems that one could truly utter (28):14
(28) Kripto believes what is expressed by `Superman ﬂies'.
Just like the previous sentences, (28) is true if, and only if, Kripto believes the
cognitive content of (2) for him. According to (T10.c), the cognitive content
of (2) for Kripkto is the mode of presentation he associates with (2) or with
one of its translations. But since Kripto does not speak any language that
has the name `Superman' or one of its translations, according to (T10.c), (28)
turns out false, contrary to our intuitions.
Surely at this point one might want to keep (T10.c) and simply reject that
non-linguistic animals (i.e., animals who do not speak a language that we can
be translated into English, Portuguese, etc.) have beliefs.15 I, however, am
12I suppose there is a case to be made that Kripto knows the name `Superman' if he
consistently responds to commands  like when someone asks where is Superman, and
Krypto goes after him. But in that case, we can say that Kripto associates a cognitive
content with the name, and the case will not require a modiﬁcation of (T10.c). To get to
an objection to (T10.c) we need to suppose that Krypto has not learned Superman's name.
This is not a dubious assumption; dogs do not know their owners's name at least for the
ﬁrst couple of months they were adopted.
13See Bérmudez [1], Camp [8], Carruthers [10, 11], Glock [27, 28] and Rescorla [51].
14I do not mean to suggest that the sentence `Kripto believes that Superman ﬂies' entails
(28), or that the latter is true in virtue of the truth of the former. All I am saying is that
in this situation we can truly utter (28).
15See Davidson [15, 16] and Stich [68] and Dennett [17] to some extent.
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not so inclined based on the overwhelming evidence we have that at least some
non-linguistic animals have some beliefs16. But, even if one rejects Kripto's
case as a real counterexample, we can still come up with other counterexamples
to (T10.c). For instance, suppose that in Akkadian.17 there are no names for
Superman, but that Hamurabi, a competent speaker of Akkadian, uses only
demonstratives (`this', `that') to refer to Superman18 Still, Hamurabi can have
beliefs about Superman, and it seems that we could truly utter (29), even
though there is no mode of presentation Hamurabu associates with (2) or
one of its translations, since, by assumption, there are no names to refer to
Superman:
(29) Hamurabi believes what is expressed by `Superman ﬂies'.
So, what could be the cognitive content of `Superman' for Kripto and Hamurabi,
and how could we modify (T10.c) to accommodate it?
Here it is worth pointing out that even though it is important that a theory
makes room for speakers to associate the same cognitive content with both
`Superman' and `Clark Kent', it seems undeniable that our linguistic practices
are such that thinking of Superman as the man who wears red underwear over
blue pants is most commonly associated with `Superman' than `Clark Kent'.
If someone does not know that Superman is Clark Kent, and believes that
16Of course, such evidence might suggest that the conception of belief is radically diﬀerent
from the orthodoxy. In this case, I take this to mean that the orthodox conception of belief
is incorrect and not that animals do not have beliefs and that we need to make adjustments
on our account of beliefs.
17Akkadian is an extinct East Semitic language that was spoken in ancient Mesopotamia,
which is believed to be the language Hamurabi spoke.
18See Braun [4, p. 570].
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the guy named `Clark Kent' ﬂies around with his red underwear over blue
pants, we would seriously doubt of his understanding of Jerry Siegel's comics.
With this in mind, I propose that for non-linguistic cognitive subjects, like
Kripto, the cognitive content of an expression for they is stipulated to be
a mode of presentation that at the moment we take to best represent our
practices, with certain modiﬁcations to be in tune with the cognitive ability of
the cognitive subject in question. In Kripto's case, the cognitive subject is a
dog, so the cognitive content of `Superman' for him could be something along
the lines the man who wears very dark brownish gray thingy over blue thingy,
and the cognitive content of `Clark Kent' is the guy who wears glasses. Perhaps
even these cognitive contents are too sophisticated for a dog. Precisely which
cognitive content it is will depend on which concepts Kripto is can acquire,
which I will not address it here, as it would stray us from our main topic19.
At this point we could be tempted to spell out a fourth version of (T10) to
account for cases similar to Kripto. But I do not think that it will help us move
forward with the project because we will eventually come up with a case that
19A diﬀerent but related question is about when (28) and (30) below are true:
Kripto believes what is expressed by `Clark Kent ﬂies'.
Is it possible for they to diﬀer in truth-value? In other words, can Kripto have two diﬀerent
ways of thinking and believing about Superman? Those are very interesting question but
only tangential to my project. One way of answering these questions is to look at Kripto's
behavior, and compare it with the behavior of those agents who hold beliefs about the
guy named `Superman' and `Clark Kent'. To illustrate, suppose come up with experiments
that lead us to conclude that Krypto is disposed to jump into Superman's arms when on a
building on ﬁre and when Superman is wearing a red cape. In this case it seems reasonable
to infer that (28) is true. Now suppose, other reliable set experiments suggests that Krypto
is not disposed to jump into Superman's arms in the same situation when Superman is
wearing his glasses but not his cape. In this case, we can conclude that but (30) is false.
These two results together might be taken to suggest that Krypto indeed has diﬀerent ways
of thinking about the same person.
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this new version cannot accommodate,20 which would require a new revision,
which would most likely be subject to new counterexamples, and so on. The
cases considered here, however, seem to suggest that what the cognitive content
of `N ' for a speaker is varies according to certain features of the context: the
agent, what she knows, her conceptual abilities, and sometimes our linguistic
practices, etc. For this reason I propose that we go back to (T10) and leave it
as general as it is, without trying to spell it out the details. This will give us
the malleability required to deal with a variety of cases.
4.3.1 Frege's Puzzle (i)
I began section Section 4.3 raising a question: why is it that the cognitive
content of `Superman' and `Clark Kent' for Lois Lane are diﬀerent? We got an
answers right at the beginning: diﬀerent modes of presentation are retrieved
when she hears or reads the name `Superman' and `Clark Kent', though I
argues that it does not generalize to explain the cognitive content of names
for cognitive subjects in all cases. Now we have a full answer to Frege's Puzzle
(i).
How is it possible that Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies but she
does not believe that Clark Kent ﬂies, given that Superman is Clark Kent and
her beliefs are most naturally expressed by sentences that express the same
semantic content, (2) and (5), respectively? The answer is: they express dif-
20Like Kripke's Paderewski case that suggest that diﬀerent utterances of a name can have
diﬀerent modes of presentation associated with it.
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ferent cognitive contents for Lois Lane because she associates diﬀerent modes
of presentation of Superman with the names that are part of the sentences.
As for the second version of Frege's Puzzle (i): how is it possible that Lois
Lane believes that Superman ﬂies and that Clark Kent does not ﬂy, given
that Superman is Clark Kent and her beliefs are most naturally expressed by
sentences with contradictory semantic contents, (2) and (6)? The answer is:
they do not express contradictory cognitive contents for Lois Lane because she
associates diﬀerent modes of presentation of Superman with the names that
are part of the sentences. Consequently, the cognitive content of (6) for her is
not a simple negation of (2) for her.
Unlike previous attempts to rescue the Millian Theory from Frege's Puzzle
(i), in my view we do not have the problem of singling out beliefs from other
representations. Lois Lane's beliefs that Superman ﬂies and Clark Kent ﬂies
have two diﬀerent cognitive contents, the σ ﬂies and the ρ ﬂies, respectively.
They are not two diﬀerent ways of thinking about the same belief content.
4.4 Belief Reports
Now that we have an answer to Frege's Puzzle (i), it is time to move on to
Frege's Puzzle (ii): how is it possible for (7) and (8) to have diﬀerent truth-
values if they express the same semantic content?
(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
(8) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
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Here I will oﬀer an account of the diﬀerence in the truht-value of (7) and (8)
which maintains that `to believe' is a two-place predicate between a cognitive
subject and a cognitive content, and that (7) and (8) have diﬀerent truth-
values.
4.4.1 Context Sensitivity without Indexicality
My account is primarily inspired by MacFarlane's [40], Predelli's [43],
Searle's [62] and Travis's [71] ideas on context sensitivity without indexical-
ity, that is, the claim that the truth-value of some sentences is sensitive to
contextual elements even though their semantic content is not. Consider this
sentence:
(31) Bill cut the grass.
Aside from tense,21 (31) seems a perfect good example of a sentence with no
indexical expressions. This has commonly taken to mean two things. First,
(i) diﬀerent utterances of (31) express the same semantic content  if the
semantic content of utterances of a sentence without indexicals is supposed
to not depend on features of the context, any context in which it is uttered
should express the same content. Second, (ii) diﬀerent utterances of (31) will
agree in truth-value when we evaluate them with respect to the same state of
21`The grass' should be understood as a deﬁnite description and not a indexical expression.
Following Russell's [54] treatment of deﬁnite descriptions, it may denote diﬀerent portions
of grass depending on the context, but it has the same semantic content throughout all
contexts.
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aﬀairs, to use a neutral term for that against which we evaluate utterances22.
For instance, if Bill mows the lawn, this is a state of aﬀairs in which (31) is
true. If Bill decides to do the dishes instead, this is an state of aﬀairs in which
(31) is false. A semantic theory that endorses (i) and (ii) is called `Traditional
Semantics'.
A common objection brought against Traditional Semantics by its oppo-
nents23 is the following.
[Consider] a situation in which Bill employed a pair of scissors to
separate each of the grass blades along their vertical axis. Imagine
now an utterance v of [(31)], taking place during a discussion per-
taining to whether Bill mowed the lawn. In a scenario of this kind,
at least if our pre-theoretic inclinations are to be trusted, v is false:
Bill's actions do not count as cutting the grass, because, given the
purpose at hand, cutting the grass involves shortening the blades
by virtue of slicing them along a direction roughly parallel to the
ground. But consider a less common setting, in which, due to su-
perstitions regarding the number of grass blades in one's garden,
Bill's employer demands that it be doubled by parting each leaﬂet
in two. Take now an utterance v′ of [(31)] in a setting of this kind;
in this case, the situation at hand seems to qualify as a worldly
22State of aﬀairs in some sense play the role of what Kaplan [35] calls `circumstances of
evaluation'. However, as it will become clear shortly, we should distinguish between them,
which is why I opted for a diﬀerent terminology.
23See [47, 48, 49].
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condition with respect to which v′ is true. [43, p. 174-5]
In the case described by Predelli, we have two diﬀerent utterances of (31),
v and v′, that have diﬀerent truth-values when evaluated against the same
scenario where Bill employed a pair of scissors to separate each leaﬂet roughly
perpendicular to the ground. However, this is inconsistent with Traditional
Semantics: v and v′ express the same semantic content, thus, they should have
the same truth-value when evaluated against the same state of aﬀairs.
Predelli [43, 44] argues that Bill's case is not a counterexample to Tradi-
tional Semantics. According to him, Traditional Semantics can accommodate
the diﬀerence in the truth-value of v and v′, and insist that they express the
same content, as long as we distinguish between state of aﬀairs and worldly
conditions. This distinction will make clear that, in Bill's case, v and v′ have
diﬀerent truth-values because they are evaluated against diﬀerent state of af-
fairs. But if they were evaluated against the same state of aﬀairs, they will
have the same truth-value, as it should be. Thus, the diﬀerent in truth-value
of v and v′ does not falsify the main tenets of Traditional Semantics, namely,
(i) and (ii). Let me begin explaining the distinction between state of aﬀairs
and worldly condition.
Take a look at the ﬁgure 4.2 below:
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Figure 4.2
Looking at it at the way the paper is oriented with respect to your body
right now, the square is to the right of the circle. But, if we turn the paper
upside down, the square is to the left. Turn it 90◦ clockwise, and the square is
below the circle. Turn it 90◦ counter clockwise, and the square is now above
the circle. These are four diﬀerent state of aﬀairs that we get from cutting
the same worldly condition from four diﬀerent evaluative perspectives24. An
evaluative perspective is similar to a point of view, and a worldly condition
is what is common among diﬀerent state of aﬀairs that we get from diﬀerent
perspectives (of the same worldly condition, of course).
Now consider the following sentence:
(32) The square is to the right of the circle.
The truth-value of (32) will depend on against which state aﬀairs we evaluate
it. It is true in a state of aﬀairs s we get by cutting the worldly condition
from an evaluative perspective k where the paper is oriented with respect to
your body in a way you can read this dissertation. This is because s is a state
of aﬀairs in which the square is to the right of the circle. (32) is false in the
state of aﬀairs s′, s′′ and s′′′ we get by cutting the same worldly condition from
24`Point of evaluation' in Predelli's terminology.
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evaluative perspectives k′, k′′ and k′′′ where we turn the paper upside down,
90◦ clockwise and 90◦ counter clockwise, respectively. This is because in these
state of aﬀairs the square is not to the right of the circle.
Since (32) may have diﬀerent truth-values depending on the state of aﬀairs
we use to evaluate it, to answer the question: is (32) true or false? The answer
to this question clearly depends on which of the aforementioned evaluative per-
spectives is the relevant perspective. When we are not told which perspective
is the relevant one, we need to look for clues in the context of utterance that
indicates the evaluative interest. The evaluative interest depends on our goals
and aims in the context of utterance, among other things. When someone asks
a question of the relative position of two geometric ﬁgures in a text, it is safe
to assume that her evaluative interest is in the evaluative perspective k, that
is, where the paper is oriented with respect to your body in a way you can read
it. In this case, (32) is true. There are, of course, exception. If I had asked the
same question right after I asked you to imagine an world upside down, then
the evaluative interest would most likely be in perspective k′, and it would be
false to say that (32) is true. The relevant evaluative interest does not have
to be as explicit as in the examples I'm proposing. In any case, context of
utterance is in charge of indicating the evaluative interest
One thing that it is important to notice is that when we talk about the
truth-value of (32) in s, s′, s′′ and s′′′, the semantic content to be evaluated
is the same. The change in truth-value is not because the semantic content
expressed by (32) changes whenever we evaluate it in diﬀerent state of aﬀairs.
Rather, it is because that against which we evaluate the same semantic content
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changed. To give a analogy, the truth-value of (1) is diﬀerent when we evaluate
it in the actual world and an alternative world w1 where Aristotle was born in
Olympia, where Superman cannot ﬂy. In the actual world it is true, but in w1
it is false. But the diﬀerence in truth-value of (1) is not because its semantic
content changes from the actual world to w1. It is because that against which
we evaluate its semantic content changes.
With the notions of state of aﬀairs, evaluative perspective and worldly
conditions, Predelli explains how two utterances of (31) have diﬀerent truth-
values without giving up (i) and (ii). In Bill's case, the worldly condition is:
Bill split each leaﬂet using a pair of scissors. And we have two evaluative
perspectives e and e′: to cut the grass parallel to the ground and to cut the
grass perpendicular to the ground, respectively. From e, the worldly condition
yields a state of aﬀairs se in which Bill did not cut the grass; after all, Bill did
not cut the grass parallel to the ground. From e′, the worldly condition yields
a state of aﬀairs se′ in which Bill cut the grass; after all, Bill cut the grass
perpendicular to the ground.
When we consider (31) in a discussion about whether Bill mowed the lawn,
it is clear that the evaluative interest is in having the grass cut parallel to the
ground. So, the relevant evaluative perspective is e, in which case an utterance
of (31), that is, v, is false. On the other hand, when we consider (31) in a
context c′ in which Bill's employer asks that the grass blades in his garden be
doubled by parting each leaﬂet in two, the evaluative interest is in having the
grass cut perpendicular to the ground. So, the relevant perspective is e′, in
which case an utterance of (31), that is, v′, is true. Thus, (31) is false in se
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and true in se′ . That is to say, v is false and v′ is true.
Note that we explain the diﬀerence in truth-value of v and v′ without
distinguishing their semantic content: the same sentence (31) expressing the
same semantic content is evaluated against diﬀerent state of aﬀairs. Thus (i)
is preserved. Predelli's account also preserves (ii)  diﬀerent utterances of
(31) agree in truth-value when evaluated in the same state of aﬀairs. Any
utterance of (31) evaluated against in se is false; and any utterance evaluated
against se′ is true. Consequently, the diﬀerence in truth-value of v, v′ does
not entail a contradiction. In Predelli's view, two utterances u and u′ entail a
contradiction if, and only if, u and u′ express the same semantic content and
they have diﬀerent truth-values with respect to the same state of aﬀairs. V
and v′ do not ﬁt this scheme because v is true in se and v′ is false in a diﬀerent
state of aﬀairs se′ .
In the next section I will apply this model of explanation with state of
aﬀairs being distinguished from evaluative perspectives and worldly conditions
to explain the truth-value of belief ascriptions and explain Frege's Puzzle (ii)
and other related puzzles25
4.4.2 Frege's Puzzle (ii)
So, how is it possible for (7) and (8) to have diﬀerent truth-values if they
express the same semantic content?
25Predelli [43] has indicated that this model could be used to explain belief ascriptions,
but has not developed it in details. Additionally, our proposals though similar in spirit diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in details, as he endorses the Traditional Claim and I do not.
77
What's Next? Positive Theory Chapter 4
(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
(8) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
Here I will adapt the strategy Predelli uses to explain the diﬀerence in truth-
value of v and v′.
In this case, the relevant worldly condition is part of Lois Lane's cognitive
life, speciﬁcally the cognitive contents inside and outside her belief box.26 In
my view, this can be illustrated as ﬁgure 4.3 below:
CCS does not ﬂy
CCCK ﬂies
CCS ﬂies
CCCK does not ﬂy
Lois Lanes's Belief Box
Figure 4.3
Such that `CCS ﬂies ', `CCCK ﬂies ', ` CCCK does not ﬂy ', and `CCS does not
ﬂy ' stand for the cognitive content for Lois Lane of the following sentences,
respectively:
(2) Superman ﬂies.
(5) Clark Kent ﬂies.
26Keeping in mind that the concept of belief box is being used merely as a pedagogical
aid.
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(6) Clark Kent does not ﬂy.
(33) Superman does not ﬂy.
When discussing Lois Lane's beliefs, it is common to have in mind the cognitive
contents she associates with `Superman' and `Clark Kent'. In my proposal this
gives us two evaluative perspectives i and i′: to have the cognitive content of
(2) for Lois Lane in Lois Lane's belief box, and to have the cognitive content
of (5) for Lois Lane in Lois Lane's belief box, respectively. From i, the worldly
condition in ﬁgure 4.3 yields a state of aﬀairs si in which Lois Lane believes
that Superman ﬂies because CCS ﬂies is the cognitive content of (2) for her
and is in her belief box. From i′, the worldly condition in ﬁgure 4.3 yields
a state of aﬀairs si′ in which Lois Lane does not believe that Superman ﬂies
because CCCK ﬂies is the cognitive content of (2) for her and is outside her
belief box.
In my view, when we evaluate (7) and (8) against si, they come out true:
in si Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies and the sentences are true if, and
only if, Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies. On the other hand, when we
evaluate the sentences against si′ , both come out false: in si′ Lois Lane does
not believe that Superman ﬂies and the sentences are true if, and only if, Lois
Lane believes that Superman ﬂies. The diﬀerence in the intuitive truth-value
of (7) and (8) that generates Frege's Puzzle (ii) is that we consider their truth-
value when evaluated against diﬀerent states of aﬀairs. This is because in the
set up of Frege's Puzzle (ii), our evaluative interest is in the cognitive content
of the sentence in the `that'-clause for the cognitive subject in question. And
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because (7) and (8) have diﬀerent sentences in their respective `that'-clause,
the relevant evaluative perspectives will be diﬀerent, i and i′, respectively.
To illustrate my view better let us consider two contrasting cases.
Fire Case
Lois Lane is on top of a building that is on ﬁre. You and I are debating
on how to save her. We see that Superman is behind her and realize
that if she jumps on his arms, then he could carry her to ground safe
and sound. So we decide to tell Lois Lane that Superman is behind her.
In this scenario, it is perfectly reasonable for me to argue that we should yell
(34) and not (35) because (7) is true but (8) is false.
(34) Superman is behind you.
(35) Clark Kent is behind you.
When we consider (7) in a discussion about what to yell to Lois Lane, as
in the Fire Case, it is clear that our goal is to ﬁnd an English sentence that,
if uttered, motivates Lois Lane to act in a certain way. This indicates that
evaluative interest in this case is in the cognitive content of the `that'-clause
of (7) and (8) for Lois Lane. Thus, when we judge (7) true, we look at the
worldly conditions in ﬁgure 4.3 from the perspective of the cognitive content
of the sentence in the `that'-clause of (7) for her. As explained before, this
yields a state of aﬀairs si where Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies. On
the other hand, when we judge (8) false, we look at the worldly conditions
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from a diﬀerent perspective, that is, the perspective of the cognitive of the
sentence in the `that'-clause of (8) for Lois Lane. This yields a state of aﬀairs
si′ where Lois Lane does note believe that Superman ﬂies. Thus, (7) is true
in si and (8) is false in si′ .
The diﬀerence in the intuitive truth-value of (7) and (8) under the proposed
analysis is not problematic because they get diﬀerent truth-values for they are
evaluated against diﬀerent state of aﬀairs  just like there is no problem with
(1) being true in the actual world and false in the w1; it gets diﬀerent truth-
value when evaluated against diﬀerent possible worlds. Strictly speaking, (7)
and (8) have the same truth-value in the state of aﬀairs.
Now consider a case in which (7) and (8) seem to have the same truth-value.
Counting Case
We are counting how many people are believed by Lois Lane as a person
who ﬂies. We start with Jonathan, and decide Lois Lane does not believe
he ﬂies. We move on to Lex Luthor, and decide she does not believe he
ﬂies. Then we consider Clark Kent.
At this point it is perfectly reasonable for me to argue that she believes Clark
Kent ﬂies, and that (8) is true, given that she believes that Superman ﬂies,
and that Superman and Clark Kent are the same person. If this makes sense,
in the Counting Case both (7) and (8) are true.
According to my proposal, this is explained by the fact that the two sen-
tences are evaluated against the same state of aﬀairs, and it correctly predicts
that they have the same truth-value. The argument oﬀered is reasonable in
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the Counting Case partially because our goal is to ﬁnd how many people Lois
Lane believes can ﬂy, and for such a goal, the diﬀerence in the cognitive con-
tent that Lois Lane associates with the names `Superman' and `Clark Kent' is
irrelevant. Our evaluative interest is in any cognitive content about a person
that ascribes her the property of ﬂying. From this evaluative perspective i′′,
the worldly conditions in ﬁgure 4.3 yields a state of aﬀairs si′′ in which Lois
Lane believes that Superman ﬂies because CCS ﬂies is about Superman and
is in Lois Lane's belief box. Thus, (8) is true in si′′ , and so is (7).
Interestingly, (8) gets diﬀerent truth-values in the Fire Case and in the
Counting Case. This, however, does not entail a contradiction because in
my view we have a contradiction if, and only if, a semantic content (and
derivatively a sentence) has diﬀerent truth-values in the same state of aﬀairs.
And (8) gets diﬀerent truth-values in diﬀerent state of aﬀairs; just like there
is no contradiction in (1) getting diﬀerent truth-values in diﬀerent worlds.
To sum up, (7) and (8) diﬀer in truth-value not because they express
diﬀerent semantic contents, as the Fregean Theory proposes. Their semantic
content is the same, as the Millian Theory advocates, and their truth-value is
the same when we evaluate them against the same state of aﬀairs. But when
we evaluate them in diﬀerent states of aﬀairs, as I argued to be the case in
Frege's Puzzle (ii), they might diﬀer in truth-value. This, however, does not
entail a contradiction.
In general, the truth-conditions of belief reports are given by (T12) below27:
27In principle, (T12) can be even more generalized to all mental states report by replacing
`to believe' by the relevant cognitive verb.
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(T12) pS believes that Pq is true in a state of aﬀairs s if, and only if,
S believes that P in s.
Whether S believes that P in s depends on the worldly conditions w and the
evaluative perspective e.
I will spend the next two sections explaining how (T12) accounts for some
famous puzzling cases we ﬁnd in the literature.
4.4.3 (36) & (37)
Recall the story about José in Section 4.3. He is ignorant that `Londres'
is the translation of `London' in Portuguese and it seems that both (36) and
(37) below are true:
(36) José believes that London is pretty.
(37) José believes that London is not pretty.
What needs to be explained in this case is how it is possible for José to believe
a cognitive content and its negation28, without him being irrational. This case
is very similar Lois Lane's case where (7) is true and (8) is false, if we take the
latter to mean that Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent does not ﬂy. And as
it will become clear, the solution to the puzzle is very similar too.
The relevant worldly conditions in José's case are the cognitive contents
about London in José's belief box represented by the ﬁgure below:29
28See explanation in Second Thesis, page 58.
29Section 4.3
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CCLondresis not pretty
CCLondonis pretty
CCLondresis pretty
CCLondonis not pretty
José's Belief Box
Figure 4.1
When we truly report José's beliefs with utterances of (36) and (37), we (gen-
erally) intend to be sensitive to the known fact that José associates diﬀerent
cognitive contents with diﬀerent sentences in diﬀerent languages. This sug-
gests that the evaluative interest we have in mind when judging (36) and (37)
are diﬀerent. We consider (36) true because the evaluative perspective l we
use to look at the worldly conditions in ﬁgure 4.1 is the cognitive content José
associates with (22)  Londres é bonita. This yields a state of aﬀairs sl in
which José's believes that London is pretty because CCLondresis pretty is the
cognitive content of (23) for him, and it is in his belief box. So, (36) is true in
sl.
On the other hand, we consider (37) false because we look at the worldly
conditions from a diﬀerent evaluative perspective. With (37), the evaluative
perspective l′ we use is the the cognitive José (currently) associates with (24) 
London is not pretty. This yields a state of aﬀairs sl′ in which José believes that
London is not pretty because CCLondonis not pretty is the cognitive content
of (24) for him, and it is in his belief box30
30Note that my account of (36) and (37) is very similar to (7) and (8), which further
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So, to answer the question Kripke raised in his original paper, Does José
believes that London is pretty?, is yes and no, depending on the evaluative
interest and, consequently, on the evaluative perspective.
4.4.4 (38) & (39)
Lastly, I will explain how my account successfully accommodates cases of
multiple interactions of attitude verbs. Consider the following case:
Conﬁdant Case
Jonathan Kent is Superman's father and conﬁdant. He knows that Su-
perman is Clark Kent, and thinks about them in the same way  his son,
for instance. Superman told him about Lois Lane and that she does not
know about his secret identity.
In this case, it seems that (38) is true but that (39) is false:
(38) Jonathan believes that Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
(39) Jonathan believes that Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
The intuitive truth-value of (38) and (39) is a problem to my theory. According
to it, they express the same semantic content, and (38) is true if, and only if,
(39) is true, contrary to our intuitions.
The problem generated by the Conﬁdant Case seems similar to the problem
Frege's Puzzle (ii) raises: from a Millian perspective, (7) and (8) express the
supports my claim on page 65 that replacing (T10.b) by (T10.c) is not ad hoc.
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same semantic content, and so either they same truth-value, but intuitively
they have diﬀerent truth-values.
(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
(8) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
One would naturally think that the same line of explanation can be ex-
tended to (38) and (39). However, this will not do. My proposed account
of (7) and (8) is successful because (i) our evaluative interest in the Frege's
Puzzle (i) is sensitive to diﬀerences in the name used to refer to Superman;
(ii) the cognitive contents of (2) and (5) for Lois Lane are diﬀerent, with the
diﬀerence being in the cognitive content of the names `Superman' and `Clark
Kent' for her; (iii) the worldly condition is such that only one of the them is
in her belief box.31
(2) Superman ﬂies.
(5) Clark Kent ﬂies.
For the same model of explanation to explain away the contradiction with
(38) and (39) in the Conﬁdant Case, we need to have the same relevant el-
ements: (i) our evaluative interest in the Conﬁdant Case has to be sensitive
to diﬀerences in the name used to refer to Superman in the belief reports; (ii)
the cognitive contents of (7) and (8) for Jonathan have to be diﬀerent, with
the diﬀerence being in the cognitive contents of `Superman' and `Clark Kent'
31Section 4.4.2, page 77.
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for Jonathan; and (iii) the worldly condition has to be such that one of them
is in his belief box, as represented by the ﬁgure below:
CCLL−CK
CCLL−S
CCJS=CK ﬂies
Jonathan's Belief Box
Figure 4.4
such that `CCLL−S' and `CCLL−CK ' stands for the cognitive content of (7)
and (8) for Jonathan, respectively, and `CCJS−CK ﬂies ' stands for the cognitive
content of (2) and (5) for Jonathan.
Now we explain the diﬀerence in the truth-value of (38) and (39) in the
usual manner. In the context of the Conﬁdant Case, when we judge (38), our
evaluative interest is in the cognitive content of (7) for Jonathan. Given this
evaluative perspective f and the worldly condition in ﬁgure 4.4, we get a state
of aﬀairs sf in which Jonathan believes that Lois Lane believes that Superman
ﬂies because the cognitive content of (7) for Jonathan, namely, CCLL−S, is in
his belief box. Thus, (38) is true in sf . On the other hand, when we consider
(39), our evaluative interest shifts to the cognitive content Jonathan associates
with (8). From this evaluative perspective f ′ and the worldly condition in
ﬁgure 4.4, we get a state of aﬀairs sf ′ in which Jonathan does not believe that
Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent ﬂies because the cognitive content of (8)
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for Jonathan, namely, CCLL−CK , is not in his belief box. Thus, (39) is false
in sf ′ . The intuitive diﬀerence in the truth-value of (38) and (39) does not
entail a contradiction because we get them by evaluating the (same) semantic
content is against diﬀerent state of aﬀairs.
Unfortunately, things are not that simple. In the Conﬁdant Case, we have
(i) and (iii). But it is not clear that we have (ii) because it is not clear that we
have the resources necessary to distinguish the cognitive contents of (7) and
(8) for Jonathan.
According to (T9), the cognitive content of a sentence for a cognitive sub-
ject is a function of the cognitive contents of its basic parts for the cognitive
subject. This together with the assumption that the cognitive content of `Su-
perman' and `Clark Kent' for Jonathan is the same entails that the cognitive
content of (7) and (8) is the same as well. It follows from this that, despite my
desire to say otherwise, CCLL−S and CCLL−CK are the same cognitive content,
and the worldly condition represented in ﬁgure 4.4 is not possible, unless we
say that Jonathan is irrational for believing and disbelieving the same cog-
nitive content.32 Thus, my account falls short of explaining the prima facie
contradiction in (38) and (39).
A straightforward way of solving this problem is to argue that the cogni-
tive contents of `Superman' and `Clark Kent' in (7) and (8) for Jonathan are
actually diﬀerent. This is the strategy I will pursue. I will argue that the
cognitive contents of `Superman' and `Clark Kent' for Jonathan in (7) and (8)
32See Second Thesis, page 58.
88
What's Next? Positive Theory Chapter 4
are diﬀerent because they are the cognitive contents Jonathan takes them to
have for Lois Lane, and he takes them to be diﬀerent for her. Thus, CCLL−S
and CCLL−CK are indeed diﬀerent.
Jonathan in the Conﬁdant Case is in a very similar position as we are: we
all have enough information about Lois Lane to infer that she has two diﬀerent
ways of thinking about Superman. Surely we might not know exactly how
she thinks about Superman, which concepts are involved or how Superman is
represented, but we know that the cognitive content of `Superman' and `Clark
Kent' for her is diﬀerent,33 and that is enough. We can now think of Superman
in two diﬀerent ways: as the man she thinks in one way and the man she thinks
in another way, such that `one way' and `another way' stand for Lois Lane's
way of thinking of Superman. We do not know which cognitive content `one
way' and `another way' stand for. But that is not a problem; all we need to
believe is that they are diﬀerent ways. This is why CCLL−S and CCLL−CK 
the cognitive contents of (7) and (8) for Jonathan  are diﬀerent. The ﬁrst is
roughly Lois Lane believes that the man she thinks in one way ﬂies, and the
second is something along the lines Lois Lane believes that the man she thinks
in the other way ﬂies.
This solution to the puzzle generated by the Conﬁdant Case becomes very
attractive if we note that this is roughly how we have been discussing the
cognitive contents of `Superman' and `Clark Kent' for Lois Lane in this chapter
to talk about the truth-value of (7) and (8). (7) is true because Lois Lane
33Technically, what we, as ordinary people, know is that she has two ways of thinking
about Superman associated with the names `Superman' and `Clark Kent'.
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ascribes the property of ﬂying to Superman when she thinks of him in one
way (in the way she associates with `Superman'), and (8) is false because
she does not ascribe the property to Superman when she thinks of him in
another way (in the way she associates with `Clark Kent'). Despite the fancy
terminology of I have been using, the only concepts we really need to be in
a position to borrow Lois Lane's ways of thinking about Superman (in the
way just described) are concepts of which we have some implicit and intuitive
grasp, like the concept of ways of thinking of a person, of believing, etc.
This way out of this conundrum generated by multiple iterations of attitude
verb is somewhat Fregean in spirit. The general strategy is to suppose a
shift in the cognitive content of names (and other linguistic expressions) in
belief contexts, just like Frege suggested. The cognitive content of the name
`Superman' for Jonathan is one when it is in (2) and and another when it is
in (7). However, unlike Frege suggested, this shift in cognitive content of the
name does not entail a shift in the object it is about, or in the referent of the
name, much less in the semantic content. The cognitive content of `Superman'
in (2) and (7) for Jonathan, namely, the man Lois Lane thinks in one way and
the man Lois Lane thinks in another way are both about Superman and not
about Lois Lane's cognitive.
In the Conﬁdant Case, the cognitive content of `Superman' and `Clark
Kent' in (7) and (8) for Jonathan match the cognitive content of the names
in (2) and (5) for Lois Lane, in the sense that Lois Lane has diﬀerent ways of
thinking about Superman, and so does Jonathan. But there might not be a
match when we are mistaken about someone else's way of thinking about an
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object, as is Lois Lane situation in the following case:
Party Case
At the end of the year party at the Daily Planet, Clark Kent brings his
father, Jonathan. Before introducing his father to Lois Lane, Clark Kent
tells him that Lois Lane does not know about his secret identity, and asks
him to keep this secret. At some point during the party, Lois Lane and
Jonathan are talking about a story she is writing on how Superman saved
the city once again. Jonathan agrees with Lois Lane that they are very
lucky to have Superman protecting the city, and behaves in a way that
does not reveal to her that he knows about his son's secret identity. The
party ends, and Lois Lane has no clue that Clark Kent is Superman,
much less that Jonathan knows it.
In this case, we are inclined to think that (40) is true whereas (41) is false:
(40) Lois Lane believes that Jonathan believes that Superman ﬂies.
(41) Lois Lane believes that Jonathan believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
In my view, we explain the diﬀerence in their truth-value by a diﬀerence in
the state of aﬀairs against which the same semantic content is evaluated. In
the Party Case, we have the following relevant worldly conditions:
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CCJ−CK
CCCK ﬂies
CCJ−S
CCS ﬂies
Lois Lane's Belief Box2
Figure 4.5
such that, `CCS ﬂies ', `CCCK ﬂies ', `CCJ−S' and `CCJ−CK ' stand for the
cognitive content of (2), (5), (42) and (43) for Lois Lane, respectively.
(42) Jonathan believes that Superman ﬂies.
(43) Jonathan believes that Clark Kent ﬂies.
The cognitive content of `Clark Kent' and `Superman' in (42) and (43) for
Lois Lane are diﬀerent because they are the cognitive contents Lois Lane takes
them to have for Jonathan, and she clearly believes them to be diﬀerent in
the Party Case. For all Lois Lane knows, Jonathan thinks of Superman in two
diﬀerent ways, just like her. After all, she does not know about Clark Kent's
secret identity, and so she has no reason to believe that Jonathan knows about
it. Thus, according to Lois Lane, Jonathan thinks of Superman in two diﬀerent
ways: as the man he thinks in one way and the man he thinks in another way.
This is why CCJ−S and CCJ−CK  the cognitive content of (42) and (43) for
Lois Lane, respectively  are diﬀerent. The ﬁrst is, roughly, Jonathan believes
that the man he thinks in one way ﬂies, and the second is, roughly, Jonathan
believes that the man he thinks in the other way ﬂies. There is no match
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between the cognitive content of `Superman' and `Clark Kent' in (42) and
(43) for Lois Lane and the cognitive content of the names in (2) and (5) for
Jonathan because Lois Lane is mistaken about Jonathan's cognitive life (due
to the fact that she is unaware of Superman's identity).
Now we explain the diﬀerence in the truth-value of (40) and (41) in the
usual manner. Like in the context of Frege's Puzzle (ii), when we report
Lois Lane's beliefs about Superman, we generally intend to be sensitive to the
known fact that she thinks of him in two diﬀerent ways, which are associated
with diﬀerent names. So the relevant evaluative perspective p we use to look at
the worldly conditions when we judge (40) to be true is the cognitive content of
(42) for Lois Lane. This yields a state of aﬀairs sp in which Lois Lane believes
that Jonathan believes that Superman ﬂies because CCJ−S is the relevant
cognitive content and is in her belief box. Thus, (40) is true in sp. On the
other hand, when we consider (41), we look at the cognitive content of (43)
for Lois Lane. So the relevant evaluative perspective p′ we use to look at the
worldly conditions when we judge it to be true is the cognitive content of (43)
for Lois Lane. This yields a state of aﬀairs sp′ in which Lois Lane does not
believe that Jonathan believes that Clark Kent ﬂies because CCJ−CK is the
relevant cognitive content and is not in her belief box. So, (41) is false in sp′ .
The general idea of the shift in the cognitive content of a name `N ' for a
cognitive subject S when `N ' appears in sentence with multiple iterations of
attitude verbs is captured by the following thesis:
(T13) The cognitive content of a name `N ' in pS ′ believes that S
believes that N is Fq for S ′ is the cognitive content S ′ believes
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to be the cognitive content of `N ' for S.
A little bit of history
The puzzle generated by multiple iterations of attitude verbs can be traced
back to an objection Mates [41] brought up against Carnap's analysis of in-
direct belief reports, also known as Mates's Problem. I do not want to go
into the details of the debate34, but it is worth brieﬂy discussing one of the
consequences pointed out by Putnam [45]. According to him, Mates's objec-
tion can be used to argue that the widely held view that expressions with
the same sense [semantic content] are interchangeable in all contexts is false
 a conclusion that many philosophers are eager to avoid. Here I will brieﬂy
explain how my proposed theory deals with Mates's objection.
Mates [41, p.1256] starts oﬀ with the assumption that for any two sen-
tences D and D′, if they are synonymous, i.e., have the same meaning, then
the following sentences are synonymous as well:
(44) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that D, believes that D.
(45) Nobody doubt that whoever believes that D, believes that D′.
Assuming that synonymous expression are interchangeable in all contexts, as
it seems reasonable, and given that D and D′ are synonymous, then (44) and
(45) cannot diﬀer in truth-value, or else we have a contradiction. However,
Mates points out, there are putative counterexamples. To borrow Church's
34See Burge [6], Carnap [9], Church [12], Mates [41], and Putnam [45].
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[12] example, suppose (as it is reasonable) `fortnight' and `period of (consec-
utive) fourteen days' are synonymous. In this case, (46) and (47) below are
synonymous too:
(46) The seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight.
(47) The seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than a period of
(consecutive) fourteen days.
Following Mates, sentences (48) and 49 below should have the same truth-
value:
(48) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that the seventh con-
sulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight believes that the
seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight.
(49) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that the seventh con-
sulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight believes that the
seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than a period of (con-
secutive) fourteen days.
Whereas (48) is no doubt true, (49) seems false. Given all we know, it is
possible for someone, say Lois Lane, to believe that the seventh consulate of
Marius lasted less than a fortnight but not believe that the seventh consulate
of Marius lasted less than a period of (consecutive) fourteen days. Thus, (48)
and (49) can have diﬀerent truth-values. This means that (46) and (47) are
not synonymous after all, which ultimately entails that our supposition that
`fortnight' and `period of (consecutive) fourteen days' are synonymous is false.
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If Mates's argument is correct, then we have problem because `fortnight' and
`period of (consecutive) fourteen days' are synonymous.
Several attempts have been made to reply to Mates's problem. Putnam
[45] and Fine [22] argue that whereas `fortnight' and `period of (consecutive)
fourteen days' are synonymous, (48) and (49) are not because they diﬀer in
their logical form. Salmon argues that (48) and (49) have the same truth-value
despite appearances to the contrary.35
I ﬁnd these these replies unconvincing because they dismiss at least one of
the intuitions that generates the problem: (a) `fortnight' and `period of (con-
secutive) fourteen days' are synonymous; (b) (46) and (47) are synonymous;
and (c) apparent diﬀerent in truth-value of (48) and (49). On the other hand,
in my view we have the resources to explain (c) without dismissing other intu-
itions if we replace the names in (T13) for concepts  call the resulting thesis
(T13*).
For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose a universe with only Lois Lane
and Jonathan. For all Jonathan knows (as for all we know), it is possible that
the cognitive contents of `fortnight' and `a period of (consecutive) fourteen
days' diﬀer for Lois Lane, say half the number of days of the shortest month in
non-leap years (`α', for short) and two weeks (`β', for short). Thus, according
to (T13*), the cognitive contents of the sentences below for Jonathan are
diﬀerent:
(50) Lois Lane believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
35See Salmon [55, 56, 60] in reply to Schiﬀer [61].
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less than a fortnight.
(51) Lois Lane believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a period of fourteen (consecutive) days.
The cognitive content of (50) for Jonathan is something like Lois Lane believes
that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than α, which will be abbreviate
as `CCJonLL−F '. And the cognitive content of (51) for Jonathan is something like
Lois Lane believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than β,
which will be abbreviate as `CCJonLL−P '. Since α and β are diﬀerent cognitive
contents (half the number of days of the shortest month in non-leap years and
two weeks, respectively), so are CCJonLL−F and CC
Jon
LL−P
By compositionality of cognitive content, the cognitive content of (52) and
(53) below for Jonathan are also diﬀerent:
(52) If Lois Lane believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a fortnight, then she believes that the seventh con-
sulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight.
(53) If Lois Lane believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a fortnight, then she believes that the seventh con-
sulate of Marius lasted less than a period of fourteen (consecu-
tive) days.
The cognitive content of (52) for Jonathan is something like if Lois Lane be-
lieves that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than α, then she believes
that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than α, which will be abbrevi-
ate as `CCJonLL−FF '. And the cognitive content of (53) for Jonathan is something
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like if Lois Lane believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than
α, then she believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than β,
which will be abbreviate as `CCJonLL−FP '. Again, since α and β are diﬀerent
cognitive contents, so are CCJonLL−FF and CC
Jon
LL−FP .
With further assumptions that Jonathan believes that Lois Lane is rational,
we get that Jonathan does not doubt CCJonLL−FF , but he doubts CC
Jon
LL−FP . This
worldly condition is represented in ﬁgure (4.6) below:
CCJonLL−FFCC
Jon
LL−FP
Jonathan's Doubt Box
Figure 4.6
Figure 4.6 is only a partial representation of the relevant worldly conditions
to evaluate (48) and (49). To get the complete worldly conditions we need
to consider the cognitive content of other sentences for both Lois Lane and
Jonathan. For the sake of brevity, I will focus the discussion the cognitive
content of (52) and (53) for Jonathan. The reader interested in reconstructing
the reasoning in full should see Appendix A.
Part of what explains why in this case we judge (48) true and (49) false is
that we have in mind that people could be like Lois Lane and associate diﬀerent
cognitive contents with `fortnight' and `period of fourteen (consecutive) days',
say half the number of days of the shortest month in non-leap years and two
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weeks. This suggests that the evaluative interest when judging (48) and (49)
is in the cognitive content of the `that'-clause for Jonathan.36
When we judge (48) true, the evaluative perspective n we use to look at the
worldly conditions in ﬁgure 4.6 is the cognitive content Jonathan associates
with (52).37
This yields a state of aﬀairs sn in which nobody doubts that whoever
believes the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight, then
she believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight
because CCJonLL−FF is the cognitive content of (52) for Jonathan and is not in
his doubt box.
On the other hand, when we judge (49) to be false, the evaluative per-
spective n′ we use to look at the worldly conditions is the cognitive content
Jonathan38 associates with (53).39
This yields a state of aﬀairs sn′ in which Jonathan doubts that whoever
believes he seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight, then he
believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than a period of four-
36And Lois Lane. See Appendix A.
37And (62) below:
(62) If Jonathan believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than
a fortnight, then he believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a fortnight.
38And Lois Lane. See Appendix A.
39And (63) below:
(63) If Jonathan believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted less than
a fortnight, then he believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a period of fourteen (consecutive) days.
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teen (consecutive) days because CCJonLL−FP is the cognitive content of (53) for
Jonathan and is in his doubt box.
In my view, we explain away Mates's problem because we explain that
the diﬀerence in truth-value of (48) and (49) does not entail a contradiction,
as Mates and Putnam suggested. They have diﬀerent truth-values because
we evaluate them with respect to diﬀerent state of aﬀairs. But this does not
entail contradiction because we have a contradiction if, and only if, a semantic
content gets diﬀerent truth-values when evaluated against the same state of
aﬀairs. Consequently, in my view we block Mate's argument without giving
up the intuition `fortnight' and `period of fourteen (consecutive) days' are
synonymous (as a Fregean would argue) or that (46) and (47) are synonymous
(as Putnam and Fine argue) or that (48) and (49) have diﬀerent truth-values
(as Salmon argues).
4.5 Reply to Speaks & Salmon
We are now in position to understand better where Speaks's and Salmon's
argument went wrong. Starting with Speaks's argument, he took the validity of
the Proposition Argument to suggest that the semantic and cognitive content
are the same thing.
First, I need to deﬁne validity. Since in my view the truth-value of sentences
are relativized to state of aﬀairs, so will validity:
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(V) An argument is valid if, and only if, it is impossible for the
premises to be true in a state of aﬀairs s and conclusion false
in s.
With this notion of validity, I can explain how the Proposition Argument is
valid:
Proposition Argument:
(9.1) John said that Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(9.2) It is true that Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(9.3) Though it is true that Aristotle was born in Stagira, it would
have been false if things had gone diﬀerently.
(9.4) Mary believed that Aristotle was born in Stagira.
(9C) Therefore, there is something which John said, which was true,
which could have been false, and which Mary believed.
This argument is valid because when the premises are true evaluated with
respect to the same state of aﬀairs, the conclusion is also true. Invariantly,
the state of aﬀairs in which the premises are all true are those we get from an
evaluative perspective a where we look at cognitive contents about Aristotle
and the property of being born in Stagira, regardless of how John and Mary
think of Aristotle. From this perspective a, the worldly conditions represented
by ﬁgure 4.7 below yields a state of aﬀairs sa in which John said that Aristotle
was born in Stagira, for he has a cognitive content ascribing the property of
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being born in Stagira to Aristotle in his saying box, so to speak. Similarly,
Mary believes that Aristotle was born in Stagira because she has a cognitive
content ascribing the property of being born in Stagira to Aristotle in her
belief box.
CCMAristotleCC
J
Aristotle
John's Saying Box
CCJAristotleCC
M
Aristotle
Mary's Belief Box
Figure 4.7
(9C) is also true in sa because there is something that John said, which was
true, and that Mary believed, namely that Aristotle was born in Stagira, which
is the semantic content of the `that'-clause. To repeat, this is true because
CCJAristotle and CC
M
Aristotle are about the same object and property, and from
evaluative perspective a, this means that they say and believe the same thing,
namely, that Aristotle was born in Stagira. Thus, from this point of view
(evaluative perspective a) there is something that John said and that Mary
believed, and the conclusion is true.
There are evaluative perspectives in which the worldly condition in ﬁgure
102
What's Next? Positive Theory Chapter 4
4.7 yield a state of aﬀairs in which John said that Aristotle was born in Stagira
but that Mary does not believe it, and so the premises are not all true. For
instance, from an evaluative perspective a′ where we consider the cognitive
content of (1) for John, we get a state of aﬀairs sa′ in which John says that
Aristotle was born in Stagira but Mary does not believe it.
(1) Aristotle was born in Stagira.
This is because CCJAristotle is the cognitive content of (1) for John, and it is in
John's saying box but not in Mary's belief box.
While this fact does not invalidate the argument, some might think that,
given the worldly conditions in ﬁgure 4.7, it is an undesirable consequence of
my view that there is a state of aﬀairs in which (9.1) and (9.1) have diﬀerent
truth-values. But I do not think that this is true. There is an intuitive, and
not weak, sense in which to say that John and Mary believe the same thing
is false. If we suppose that Mary and John think of Aristotle in a way that
does not overlap, the cognitive content of their beliefs will be diﬀerent. In
this case, from an evaluative perspective that focus on the cognitive content
of (1) for John (or Mary), they do not say and believe the same thing. Stich
[69, p.578] oﬀers a more dramatic case in his objection to what he calls `the
narrow causal theories of belief':
A majority of literate Americans over the age of seven have a belief
which they express by aﬃrming `E = mc2'. And it is not implau-
sible to suppose that, by the standards of the causal account, this
belief is identical to the one that a sophisticated physicist expresses
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with the same sentence. For scientiﬁcally unsophisticated people,
however, the belief underlying their aﬃrmation of 'E = mc2' is a
largely isolated one. In reﬂecting on these cases there is a substan-
tial intuitive pull in the direction of denying that the scientist and
the man in the street are expressing the same belief. [my emphasis]
Routley [53, p.390] makes a similar point for concepts:
The notion of `our concepts' or `our conceptual scheme' (with the
`our' not too tightly speciﬁed, but perhaps excluding temporally
or culturally remote humans) is something of a myth: concepts,
discriminatory abilities, vary enormously among humans as among
animals. (In a strict philosophical sense, which there is a point in
inventing, and which many philosophers are prepared to accept,
there is no the concept of a bone: such a unique concept supposes
a uniformity that does not occur.)
Of course, this is not to say that they do not say that there is no evaluative
perspective or point of view from which they say and believe the same thing40.
It is to just acknowledge that there is a diﬀerence in their cognitive content
that from some evaluative perspectives is relevant. The fact that in my account
there is a state of aﬀairs in which the premises are not all true is, in fact, an
advantage.
40Stich [69, p.58] recognizes it too.
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As for Salmon's argument, it should be clear by now that accepting that (a)
`that Ted Kennedy is tall' refers to a semantic content, namely, <Ted Kennedy,
to be tall>  such that `Ted Kennedy ' and ; to be tall ' stand for Ted Kennedy
himself and the property of being tall, respectively , and that (b) (10) is true
if, and only if, Tom believes that Ted Kennedy is tall does not entails that the
cognitive content of Tom's belief is <Ted Kennedy, to be tall>. In my view,
from an evaluative perspective t where we focus on the cognitive content of
(56) for Tom, Tom believes that Ted Kennedy is tall in virtue of having the
cognitive content of (56) in his belief box.
(56) Ted Kennedy is tall.
4.6 Objections
In this last section I will consider four objections to my view.
Objection 1 In my account, a diﬀerence in the truth-value of (7) and (8)
in the Fire Case arises because we evaluate them from perspectives that focus
on Lois Lane's ways of thinking of Superman. On the other hand, in the
Counting Case, they have the same truth-value because we focus on the objects
(and properties) the cognitive contents are about. One might try to reduce
my explanation to the famous distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs.
According to this objection, when I talk about perspectives that focus on the
mode of presentation of cognitive contents, we can understand it as looking at
de dicto beliefs. And when I talk about perspectives that focus on the objects
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(and properties) about which cognitive contents are, we can understand as
looking at de re beliefs. In this way, in the Fire Case, we look at de dicto
beliefs Lois Lane has about Superman to evaluate the truth-value of (7) and
(8). And in the Counting Case, we look at de re beliefs Lois Lane has of
Superman.
Reply: I think this objection overlooks important details of my account and
of the discussion of de re and de dicto beliefs. Some philosophers argue that de
re and de dicto beliefs diﬀer with respect to the way the object is represented41.
In this way, a cognitive content is either de re or de dicto but not both. Thus,
if Lois Lane has a de dicto belief about Superman that he ﬂies, and a de re
belief of him that he ﬂies, then she believes two diﬀerent cognitive contents.
On the other hand, in my accoumt, if Lois Lane believes that the man who
wears red underwear over blue pants ﬂies and she believes that Superman ﬂies,
it does not necessarily follows that she believes two cognitive contents. Theses
state of aﬀairs can come from diﬀerent ways of cutting one worldly condition
where Lois Lane has only one cognitive content, say, CCS ﬂies in her belief
box. Surely one might argue that we can cash out the distinction between de
dicto and de re in this way, but this is not trivial, as implied in the objection,
and needs to be argued.
41See Burge [7] and Evans [21].
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Objection 2 My account of the truth-value of multiple iterations of attitude
verbs, as in (38) and (39), is similar to Frege's account, in that it suggests
that attitude verbs creates a special context that forces a shift in the cognitive
content of names within their scope. Giving the similarities, one might think
that the account I defend is subject to similar if not the same criticisms against
Frege's account.
Reply: I take that the main criticism to Frege's view on this issue is an
objection raised by Davidson [14] on the unlearnability of language.42 As he
notes, we are able to understand a great number of sentences in language, and
in principle an inﬁnite number of them. However, this would be an impossible
task if we could not get to the meaning of complex sentences from the meaning
of its basic parts, and how to combine them. In this way, if a speaker knows
the meaning of the names `Superman', `Lois Lane' and the predicate ` loves
', then she is in a position to know the meaning of the sentences below:
(57) Superman loves Lois Lane.
(58) Superman loves Superman.
(59) Lois Lane loves Lois Lane.
(60) Lois Lane loves Superman.
This feature of language naturally poses constraints to theories about the
semantic content. One of them is that it should ascribe semantic contents
42See also Kripke [39].
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to linguistic expressions that can be fully grasped by speakers. If a semantic
theory deviates from it, then speakers would not be able to get to the the
meaning of complex expressions, like sentences, from their knowledge of the
meaning of the basic parts of a language. The problem for Frege, as Davidson
argues, is that the view he advocates [26] seems to deny this. In his view, the
name `Superman' has inﬁnitely diﬀerent meanings (semantic contents), not all
of which ﬁnite beings like us can grasp. For according to Frege, `Superman' in
each of the sentences below has diﬀerent semantic contents.43
(2) Superman ﬂies.
(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
(38) Jonathan believes that Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies.
In (2) `Superman' expresses the semantic content content1SM , a mode of pre-
sentation of Superman himself, as explained in Section 2.2.2. In (7), however,
there is a shift in the semantic content of `Superman' because it is within the
scope of an attitude verb, namely, `to believe'44. In (7), `Superman' expresses
a semantic content content2SM , which is a mode of presentation of content
1
SM ,
43They also have diﬀerent referents but this is not much relevant for my point.
44The reason for this shift has to do with the diﬀerent in the truth-value of (7) and (8).
Frege takes that the intuitive diﬀerent in their truth-value entails a diﬀerence in the referent
of the expressions, because he takes that the truth-value of a sentence is a function of the
referents of the expressions. Since the only diﬀerence between the sentences is in the name
used to refer to Superman, Frege concludes that their referent is diﬀerent. The way Frege
cashes this out is by supposing that names in the scope of attitude verbs refer to the sense
of the name. This change of referent in the name entails a diﬀerence in its sense given
Frege's previous commitment that diﬀerence in the referent of the name entails diﬀerence
in its sense.
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that is, the semantic content of `Superman' outside the scope of the attitude
verb. In (38) there is another shift in the semantic content of `Superman',
and now it expresses a diﬀerent semantic content content3SM that is a mode
of presentation of content2SM , the semantic content of `Superman' outside the
scope of the new attitude verb introduced in (38).
In general, according to Frege, whenever an attitude verb is added to a
sentence with a proper name, the name in the resulting sentence expresses
a semantic content that is a mode of presentation of the semantic content
of the name outside the newly added attitude verb. As a result, with each
new addition of an attitude verb, the name changes its semantic content (and
referent). Given how English works, we can always add an attitude verb to a
sentence with an attitude verb. Thus, in Frege's theory each name expresses
an inﬁnite number of semantic contents (and have inﬁnitely many referents),
and no ﬁnite being can learn English and be a competent speaker in the sense
explained.
This problem does not appear in my view. To understand `Superman' in
(2), (7), (38), etc. a speaker only needs to know its referent.45 Its cognitive
content might change, and so `Superman' might have inﬁnitely many modes of
presentation: the mode of presentation for Lois Lane, the mode of presentation
for Jonathan, the mode of presentation Jonathan takes to be the mode of
presentation for Lois Lane, the mode of presentation Lois Lane takes to be the
mode of presentation for Jonathan, etc. But a competent speaker does not need
45What exactly the conditions to have this knowledge are is the topic of a heated discussion
that I will not go into details here.
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to know all cognitive contents to understand the semantic content of sentences
that has the name `Superman' because I have given up the Traditional Claim.
So despite changes in the cognitive content, the name `Superman' has a ﬁnite
semantic content that can be grasped by ﬁnite beings, and used to get to the
semantic content of complex expressions of which it is part.
Objection 3 One might also think that the account I developed here seems
ad hoc. For each case I oﬀer a diﬀerent explanation of the truth-value of belief
ascriptions carefully crafted in a way to avoid problems in the case.
Reply: It is true that the explanation of the truth-value of belief ascriptions
seems particularist in this sense. But it is only to reﬂect diﬀerences in our
evaluative interests, which is why the account is not ad hoc. As I explained
in Section 4.4.1, the idea of distinguishing worldly conditions from evaluative
perspectives and states of aﬀairs was initially proposed to account for the
truth-value of sentence with predicates not related with cognitive attitudes.
I then extended this notion to get an account of the semantic and cognitive
content that respects our most basic intuitions of the semantic and cognitive
contents of names. If anything, the fact that the initial idea can be expanded
to explain our intuitions about the truth-value of belief reports respecting our
basic intuitions (semantic and cognitive) should be another reason to believe
that it is not an ad hoc solution to the problem discussed by Predelli (and
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others) or to the puzzles involving proper names. Rather, it seems to suggest
that the phenomenon it is tracking is generalized.
Objection 4 Evaluative interests can be described very generally or very
speciﬁcally. For instance, the evaluative interest I proposed in the Fire Case
was the cognitive content associated with the sentence `Superman ﬂies' 
and the cognitive content associated with the sentence `Clark Kent ﬂies' .
But, it seems that given the description of the case, one could have described
the evaluative interest more generally, like the cognitive content associated
with the sentence within the scope of the belief-clause. If this is true, then
we actually have a contradiction. From this perspective f ′′ we have a state
of aﬀairs sf ′′ in which Lois Lane believes that Superman ﬂies  because the
cognitive content of (2) for her is in her belief box  and she does not believe
that Clark Kent ﬂies  because the cognitive content of (5) for her is not in
her belief box. Thus, (7) is true and (8) is false in sf ′′ .
Reply: The contradiction we get from f ′′ is artiﬁcial because we still eval-
uate (7) and (8) from two diﬀerent parameters. F ′′ contains the deﬁnite de-
scription `the sentence within the scope of the belief-clause' which designates
diﬀerent sentences depending on the sentence under evaluation. When evalu-
ating (7) from this general perspective `the cognitive content associated with
the sentence within the scope of the belief-clause, we take into consideration
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the cognitive content associated with (2). And when evaluating (8), we take
into consideration the cognitive content associated with (5).
I suppose there could be diﬀerent descriptions at the same level of speci-
ﬁcity (unlike the objection here), but, if I am right, this diﬀerence would be
irrelevant. If we have two diﬀerent descriptions of an evaluative perspective at
the same level, they would cut the worldly conditions in the same way, that
is, taking into consideration the same elements. In this case, we get the same
evaluative perspective, the same state of aﬀairs, and, consequently, the same
truth-value.
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Chapter 5
Final Remarks
The central thesis of this dissertation is that semantic content does not have to
be the cognitive content. Philosophers seemed inclined to think it had because
of reports of mental states, illustrated by belief reports. But in Chapter 4 I
explained how we can correctly capture their truth-conditions in a way that
does not assume the Traditional Claim.
Besides the instrumental advantage of dealing with the puzzles  which
was my primary motivation to look for an alternative account for the relation
between semantic and cognitive content , my account has a broader advantage
of being neutral in a discussion on the content of mental states. The fact that
(7) and (41) are true (in the same state of aﬀairs) does not entail we will ﬁnd
the same cognitive content in their respective belief box, even though they
are considered the same from an evaluative perspective, which is why they are
true in that state of aﬀairs.
My proposed account is also neutral with respect to the nature of content
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of mental states. It is an open question whether the content of certain mental
states, like beliefs, have to be conceptual or not (in the form of images, maps,
among others). Some philosophers argue that the content of beliefs are con-
ceptual, and creatures who do not possess concepts do not have beliefs in the
full sense. Their belief-like attitudes to nonconceptual contents are something
else, like a proto-beliefs. Other philosophers argue that beliefs can have non-
conceptual contents. In any case, if cognitive contents are semantic contents,
then there is little room to report mental states whose contents are noncon-
ceptual, since semantic content are conceptual (with the exception of proper
names). In this case, (61) is false because, since Kripto does not possess the
concept of `blue' and `pants', he cannot have a mental state the content of
which involves those concepts.
(61) Kripto sees that Superman wears blue pants.
But if we distinguish between semantic and cognitive content, we will be able
to truly report mental states with nonconceptual content, as well as those
with conceptual content. With small adjustments to the proposed analysis of
belief reports in Chapter 4, we have that (61) is true if, and only if, Kripto
see that Superman wears blue pants. This state of aﬀairs will be the case
depending on whether whatever mental content Kripkto has in his seeing box,
so to speak, consists in seeing that Superman wears blue pants from some
evaluative perspective. And, if empirical evidence favors, Kripto can be of
equal standing with Lois Lane regarding their mental state of seeing Superman
wearing blue pants. In any case, whether Kripto's mental states are similar
to Lois Lane's or not does not seem a question pertinent to semantic theories.
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Thus, the fact that in my view does not rule this option out in principle is an
advantage.
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Appendix A
Mates's Problem
The relevant worldly conditions for the truth-value of (48) and (49) is repre-
sented by the ﬁgure below:
CCLLLL−FF
CCLLJon−FF
CCLLLL−FP
CCLLJon−FP
Lois Lane's Doubt Box
CCJonLL−FF
CCJonJon−FF
CCJonLL−FP
CCJonJon−FP
Jonathan's Doubt Box
Figure A.1
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such that `CCLLLL−FF ' and `CC
Jon
LL−FF ' are the cognitive content of (52) for Lois
Lane and Jonathan, respectively:
(52) If Lois Lane believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a fortnight, then she believes that the seventh con-
sulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight.
`CCLLLL−FP ' and `CC
Jon
LL−FP ' are the cognitive content of (53) for Lois Lane and
Jonathan, respectively:
(53) If Lois Lane believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a fortnight, then she believes that the seventh con-
sulate of Marius lasted less than a period of fourteen (consecu-
tive) days.
`CCLLJon−FF ' and `CC
Jon
Jon−FF ' are the cognitive content of (62) for Lois Lane
and Jonathan, respectively:
(62) If Jonathan believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a fortnight, then he believes that the seventh con-
sulate of Marius lasted less than a fortnight.
`CCLLJon−FP ' and `CC
Jon
Jon−FP ' are the cognitive content of (63) for Lois Lane
and Jonathan, respectively:
(63) If Jonathan believes that the seventh consulate of Marius lasted
less than a fortnight, then he believes that the seventh con-
sulate of Marius lasted less than a period of fourteen (consecu-
tive) days.
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